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A brave new world of genetic testing and personalized medicine—one
in which vast amounts of patient genetic raw data can be readily
produced and analyzed in light of rapid technological advances in
whole genome sequencing and large-scale research and testing of the
effects of genetics on human health—is upon us. The proliferation of
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direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing poses new regulatory
challenges as genetic testing and information, once within the exclusive
domain of medical institutions, has migrated into the private
commercial sector.
The FDA’s traditional “protective” medical device model threatens to
stifle the burgeoning industry supporting personalized medicine, and it
is increasingly at odds with a patient-driven participatory health
movement grounded in patient autonomy and empowerment. While the
pull towards a more consumer-oriented “libertarian” or deregulatory
model is strong, if taken to an extreme it would transform hitherto
medical relationships into purely commercial transactions with
potentially adverse health and safety consequences for patients.
The FDA is on the cusp of articulating a new flexible regulatory
paradigm that maintains the FDA’s oversight role in ensuring the
accuracy of “diagnostic” genetic testing and interpretation of results,
while at the same time lowering regulatory barriers to market entry of
“informational” genetic testing and enabling consumers to order such
testing on their own initiative. At this critical juncture for regulatory
design and oversight, it is important to consider not only the FDA’s role
in promoting health and safety but also its complementary role in
innovation policy, in particular in creating and overseeing incentives for
the production and use of medical information.
Part I presents the saga of 23andMe to illustrate the shifting regulatory
regime for DTC genetic testing over the past decade. 23andMe burst
onto the scene in 2007 when it began marketing its flagship Personal
Genome Service. At that time, 23andMe operated largely outside the
purview of the FDA, against an ambiguous and uncertain regulatory
landscape. This continued until 2013, when the FDA demanded
23andMe (and other DTC testing companies) cease marketing their
products—the apogee of the FDA’s precautionary paternalistic
regulatory response. This moment took on added salience in contrast
with the company’s successful launch of DTC genetic testing with
approval by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Agency in the United Kingdom in 2014. The FDA seemed to signal a
shift in its regulatory approach with its approval of 23andMe’s DTC
carrier screening test for Bloom Syndrome in February 2015. In the
years since, the signal has intensified, with the FDA approving ten
genetic health risk tests (including Alzheimer’s risk, Parkinson’s
disease, and hereditary thrombophilia) in April 2017, the first genetic
cancer health risk test (for selected variants on BRCA1/BRCA2) in
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March 2018, and pharmacogenetic tests for variants associated with
metabolism of some therapeutic drugs in October 2018.
Part II generalizes from this case study to characterize the FDA’s
emerging regulatory model as a hybrid, combining elements from the
traditional “protective” medical device model and its contrasting
consumer-based “libertarian” model. What is perhaps most surprising,
given the Trump Administration’s overall deregulatory thrust and the
conservative and libertarian attacks on the regulation of information-
based technologies, is that the FDA continues to assert the need for
oversight, albeit pursuant to a new and evolving regulatory model.
Part III focuses on the dual roles of the FDA as safety regulator and as
health information regulator by highlighting the less well-recognized
(albeit traditional) role of the FDA in medical information production
and then considering new challenges posed by DTC genetic testing. The
FDA is well poised to play a small (albeit significant) part in the wider
effort to gather and disseminate data in the health sector; its emergent
hybrid regulatory model has potential implications for ensuring the
creation of underlying evidence and substantiation of “big data”
medical claims.
INTRODUCTION
The realms of genetic testing, personalized medicine, and consumer
health are developing at breakneck speed made possible by the con-
fluence of large-scale research on the effects of genetics on human
health, increased consumer demand, and greater commercial competi-
tion. The Human Genome Project, proceeding alongside the techno-
logical revolution in big data processing, has opened up an entirely
new world of genetic testing: one in which vast amounts of patient
genetic information can be quickly and cheaply produced and ana-
lyzed.1 “Next generation sequencing” promises a further revolution in
terms of the potential information it will provide patients, doctors,
1. Genotyping, the process 23andMe uses to identify genetic variants, gives a limited view of
an individual’s genetic makeup and generally looks for pre-established or known genetic signifi-
ers. See, e.g., What Is the Difference Between Genotyping and Sequencing?, 23ANDME, https://
customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904600-What-is-the-difference-between-genoty
ping-and-sequencing (last visited Nov. 24, 2018). Genotyping chips “require prior identification
of the variants of interest,” whereas “sequencing can be used to genotype someone for known
variants, as well as identify variants that may be unique to that person.” Id. See also Barbara J.
Evans et al., The FDA and Genomic Tests—Getting Regulation Right, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2258, 2258 (2015) (noting that older “technologies for detecting genetic variants,” including sin-
gle-nucleotide-polymorphism arrays, “are designed to capture predefined data points that are
known in advance of testing”).
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and researchers.2 These developments portend a future where
medicine is tailored to a specific patient’s needs.3 Moreover, aggregat-
ing massive amounts of genetic data promises a time in the near future
when public health officials, pharmaceutical companies, doctors, in-
surance companies, and biotechnology companies can effectively har-
ness big data to uncover previously unknown sources of illness and
disease.4
Genome sequencing has become increasingly affordable,5 while a
user-driven participatory health movement grounded in patient em-
powerment has gained momentum. One significant aspect of these de-
velopments posing acute regulatory challenges is that, with the rise of
direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing, genetic information is in-
creasingly moving out of medical institutions and into the private
commercial sector.6
2. High throughput genome sequencing, also known as “next-generation sequencing,” can se-
quence an individual’s entire genome, thereby producing vast amounts of information about an
individual’s genes. See Evans et al., supra note 1, at 2258 (“Examples include next-generation
sequencing assays that detect any variant present in a specific set of genes, whole-exome and
whole-genome sequencing tests, and copy-number variant arrays.”); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., UCM427869, OPTIMIZING FDA’S REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION
SEQUENCING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS—PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION PAPER (2014), https://www.fda
.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM427869.pdf (“Next
generation sequencing (NGS) comprises a collection of new technologies that allow rapid se-
quencing of large segments of an individual’s DNA and even an individual’s entire genome.”).
NGS opens the door for interested parties to study a vast number of genetic variants through
techniques like genome-wide association studies. Such studies promise to uncover the genetic
origins of various health problems, thereby enabling pharmaceutical companies and doctors to
address them. That this process can identify associations is clear. See, e.g., For the Scientific Com-
munity, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/publications/for-scientists/ (last visited Nov. 24,
2018) (listing numerous scientific papers finding associations between phenotypes and genes).
What is less assured is that those associations will always lead to actionable steps. See, e.g., Evans
et al., supra note 1, at 2259. R
3. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting Institutional Roles in Biomedical Innovation in a
Learning Healthcare System, 14 J. INST. ECON. 1139, 1145 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 1, at 2260; see also Erika Cule et al., Significance Testing in R
Ridge Regression for Genetic Data, BMC BIOINFORMATICS, Sept. 19, 2011, at 1–2.
5. The costs of genetic testing have dropped precipitously. See, e.g., Megan A. Allyse et al.,
Direct-to-Consumer Testing 2.0: Emerging Models of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113, 114 (2018) [hereinafter DTC Testing 2.0] (“In 2007, the cost of a DTC
panel hovered around $1000. Three years later it dropped to between $300 and $400. By 2012, it
dropped to $99 and 23andMe announced their goal of collecting 1 million users.”).
6. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
GENETIC TESTING: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS,
HEALTH, AND SOCIETY 5 (Apr. 2010), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
SACGHS_DTC_Report_2010.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE] (“As of February 2010, more than 30 Web-based companies sell DTC genetic services;
however, the volume of business is unknown. . . . Some companies provide a limited number of
genetic tests in a particular area, such as drug response or for a particular subset of health condi-
tions such as cancer. Other companies offer genetic tests for a large number of health conditions
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The current consumer genomics landscape is a mix of trusted, relia-
ble data and practices along with prematurely deployed market offer-
ings based on weak science. According to Dr. Eric Topol, a geneticist
and cardiologist at Scripps Translational Science Institute: “There’s a
big, I guess, divergence of companies that are peddling things that
have no evidence basis—like nutrigenomics, weight management,
sports genomics, all kinds of things, and on the other hand, lots of
hard, impressive data for drug DNA interactions and risks of major
diseases.”7 Topol concludes: “So there is data that is terrific and con-
tinues to be evolving, but [it’s] not widely commercialized, and then
there’s these very questionable entities selling data services that have
no basis.”8 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concurs:
“Direct-to-consumer tests have varying levels of evidence that support
their claims. Some [DTC] tests have a lot of scientific and clinical data
to support the information they are providing, while other tests do not
have as much supporting data.”9 Kenneth Offit, Chief of the Clinical
Genetics Service at Sloan Kettering Institute, has warned that “the
public health may be as much at risk from the premature deployment
of de-medicalized, commercialized testing for genetic predisposition,
as it is from the health threats of the syndromes of cancer predisposi-
tion themselves.”10 In a similar vein, a group representing genetic test-
ing companies, more than one hundred patient and advocacy groups,
genetic test manufacturers, and other parties has called for revamping
or traits and for different purposes such as diagnosis.”); see also Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the
Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technology
review.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up/ (“The number of people
who have had their DNA analyzed with direct-to-consumer genetic genealogy tests more than
doubled during 2017 and now exceeds 12 million, according to industry estimates.”); cf. Andelka
M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love . . . and More: A View
of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 16, 17 tbl.1
(2016) (finding 246 companies “offer some form of DNA test online,” including some companies
outside of the United States). Ancestry’s website explains that the company has “samples from
over 10 million people.” Our Story, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ances
try/our-story (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).
7. Heather Mack, In-Depth: Consumer Genomics and the Road to Legitimacy,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/depth-consumer-
genomics-and-road-legitimacy (quoting an interview with Dr. Topol). Companies continue to
make dubious claims. See, e.g., Nick Webbon et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing for Pre-
dicting Sports Performance and Talent Identification: Consensus Statement, 49 BRIT. J. SPORTS
MED. 1486, 1486 (2015), https://bjsm.bmj.com/content/49/23/1486.full.pdf (refuting companies’
claims that genetic tests can predict athletic ability).
8. Mack, supra note 7.
9. Direct-to-Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevi
ces/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm624726.htm (last updated Nov. 1,
2018).
10. Kenneth Offit, The Future of Clinical Cancer Genomics, 43 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 615, 619
(2016).
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regulation of genetic tests on the ground that “while accurate, reliable,
and timely genetic testing offers enormous promise to help shape our
healthcare system to meet the challenges of the 21st century, ‘poor
quality testing can harm patients and waste scarce resources.’”11
What, then, is the optimal regulatory framework for DTC genetic
testing?12 The debate over FDA regulation of genetic testing feeds
into a wider debate of governmental paternalism versus patient auton-
omy and the right to information about oneself.
This Article begins with the story of the rise, fall, and rise of
23andMe as the predominant DTC genetic testing company. This saga
provides an illustrative case study of the shifting sands of the regula-
tory landscape for DTC genetic testing. It provides a lens into the
deeper exploration in Part II of the emergence of the FDA’s hybrid
flexible regulatory model that moves away from the traditional “pro-
tective” medical device model and towards the consumer-based “lib-
ertarian” model especially as applied to innovative information-based
technology. But at the same time, it resists full-stop embrace of the
libertarian model, which, taken to the extreme, would transform med-
ical relationships into purely commercial ones.
Part III then turns to considering the dual role of the FDA as a
regulator of safety as well as of health information, specifically its ap-
propriate role in the production and dissemination of this medical in-
formation. The FDA has traditionally regulated medical products such
as prescription drugs and medical devices as well as the accompanying
11. Press Release, Genetics & Pub. Policy Center and Coal. for 21st Century Med., Overhaul
of Genetic and Other Advanced Diagnostic Testing Regulations Necessary for Personalized
Medicine, HHS Secretary Told (May 5, 2009), http://www.geneticalliance.org/sites/default/files/
pressreleasearchive/sebelius_letter_release.pdf.
12. To tackle this question fully, one would need to consider regulation by tort law, state and
federal statutory law and regulations, and the market. One would also have to consider the
extent to which federal regulation should preempt state tort law. Cf. generally Catherine M.
Sharkey, States Versus FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609 (2015).
My focus in this Article is limited to how the federal regulatory model should evolve, but of
course this cannot be fully considered in isolation. Several states, for example, have prohibited
or limited DTC genetic testing in the past. See Survey of Direct-to-Consumer Testing Statutes and
Regulations, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR. (June 2007), https://repository.library.georgetown
.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/511162/DTCStateLawChart.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; see
also 23andMe Genetic Service Now Fully Accessible to Customers in New York and Maryland,
23ANDME (Dec. 4, 2015), https://mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/23andme-genetic-ser
vice-now-fully-accessible-to-customers-in-new-york-and-maryland/ (23andMe “was not able to
process saliva samples collected in or mailed from the state of New York due to New York
Department of Health regulations designating the 23andMe Personal Genome Service as a test
requiring direct physician involvement. In Maryland, state law prohibited residents from buying
any direct-to-consumer tests that provided health related information. Those tests had to be
ordered by a doctor, according to state law.”). According to 23andMe, these state law bans no
longer applied once the FDA approved 23andMe’s tests as suitable for over-the-counter use.
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labeling. The FDA’s newly emergent flexible regulatory model recog-
nizes the significance of the fact that the product being sold is “medi-
cal information” posing health and safety risks due to false positives
and false negatives. But the FDA also serves a critical regulatory func-
tion to intervene to correct market failures in the privatization and
commercialization of consumer genetic information. A significant
component of the FDA’s review for safety and efficacy of these medi-
cal products is to evaluate the data submitted to substantiate the
claims made to diagnose, treat, or manage diseases and medical condi-
tions. The FDA is thus poised to play an enhanced role, most likely in
partnership with other agencies such as the National Institute of
Health, in the creation and exploitation of aggregate genetic
databases.
I. A SHIFTING REGULATORY REGIME FOR DTC GENETIC
TESTING: THE CASE OF 23ANDME
DTC genetic testing—which provides a means of allowing patients
to access genetic information without the involvement of a physi-
cian—emerged in the 2000s.13 And “[i]n Silicon Valley, at the height
of the dotcom boom, 23andMe was at the vanguard of a wave of inter-
est in personal genomics.”14 In 2007, 23andMe began marketing its
flagship Personal Genome Service (PGS). In certain respects,
23andMe’s business model mirrors that of a company like Facebook.15
13. Physicians have used genetic testing, in some form, for nearly fifty years. See Ricki Lewis,
A Brief History of Genetic Testing: What the First Generation of Tests Can Tell Us About the
Latest, SCI. PROGRESS: GENETICS (May 5, 2008), https://scienceprogress.org/2008/05/a-brief-histo
ry-of-genetic-testing/; see also Genetic Testing: How it is Used for Healthcare, NIH, https://report
.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=43 (last updated June 30, 2018). In addition to
eliminating the physician as learned intermediary, modern DTC genetic tests go well beyond the
earlier iterations that tested for well-defined genetic variations with well-established causalities.
See, e.g., Lewis, supra; Siobhan M. Dolan, Personalized Genomic Medicine and Prenatal Genetic
Testing, 312 JAMA 1203 (2014); Siobhan M. Dolan, Prenatal Genetic Testing, 38 PEDIATRIC
ANNALS 426, 426 (2009) (“Prenatal genetic testing options have grown tremendously over the
past 25 years. What began as testing of maternal blood to screen for neural tube defects and
chromosomal abnormalities has evolved to include a spectrum of screening and diagnostic tests
which can be performed on the mother, father, and fetus both before and during pregnancy.”);
Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genomic Services
in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475, 479 (2012) (“Huntington’s dis-
ease is highly penetrant, meaning that almost all individuals with a mutated gene will eventually
develop the disease. A genetic test for Huntington’s disease is thus highly predictive: the pres-
ence of a mutated gene correlates with an estimated lifetime disease risk of 100%. But most
diseases are significantly less penetrant.”).
14. DTC Testing 2.0, supra note 5, at 113. R
15. See, e.g., Kayte Spector-Bagdady, “The Google of Healthcare”: Enabling the Privatization
of Genetic Bio/Databanking, 26 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 515, 515 (2016) (“Since 2007, 23andMe
has offered an inexpensive product to consumers (personalized genetic analysis) to generate
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On the one hand, just as Facebook is best known for its social media
platform, 23andMe is best known for a consumer-facing product—its
Personal Genome Service. On the other hand, just as Facebook sells
user data to third parties, 23andMe sells its user “data” to third par-
ties. 23andMe has made several deals with pharmaceutical companies
where it sells access to its genetic database.16
Products like 23andMe’s saliva-testing kit paved the way for con-
sumer genomics by getting people curious about their ancestry and
their health. Since then, 23andMe has dominated the health-related
DTC genetic testing market.17 In 2015, it surpassed its goal of one
million customers,18 and today touts having “more than five million
genotyped customers around the world.”19 And Forbes Magazine re-
ported that investors estimated its value at $1.1 billion.20
A. The Ambiguous Regulatory Backdrop
When 23andMe emerged on the scene, it capitalized on an ambigu-
ous regulatory landscape in making a business decision to market its
genetic testing service largely outside the purview of the FDA.
Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA), the FDA
is tasked—along with the states, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS)—
with ensuring the safety and efficacy of medical tests and interven-
tions by monitoring laboratories that process medical samples and en-
suring testing validity.21 But, as of 2007, the FDA had declined to
exercise its prerogative to regulate so-called laboratory-developed
broader consumer data and then leveraged that data to generate profit, becoming—as board
member Patrick Chung put it—‘the Google of personalized health care.’”).
16. See, e.g., Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK and 23andMe Sign Agreement to Lever-
age Genetic Insights for the Development of Novel Medicines (July 25, 2018), https://www.gsk
.com/en-gb/media/press-releases/gsk-and-23andme-sign-agreement-to-leverage-genetic-insights-
for-the-development-of-novel-medicines/; Company, 23ANDME, https://medical.23andme.com/
company/#research (last visited July 10, 2018) (“Research is conducted independently, in collab-
oration with third parties, including academic institutions[,] . . . companies such as Pfizer and
Genentech, and nonprofits . . . .”).
17. Several other companies, such as Ancestry.com and Family Tree DNA provide ancestry-
related genetic testing.
18. Anne Wojcicki, Power of One Million, 23ANDME BLOG (June 18, 2015), https://blog.23and
me.com/news/one-in-a-million/.
19. Ancestry, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-ancestry/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).
20. See Spector-Bagdady, supra note 15, at 515.
21. See, e.g., Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth R. Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 727 (2014). There is
some debate regarding whether the FDA, CMS, and state regulations are duplicative. See, e.g.,
Sarah Y. Kwon, Regulating Personalized Medicine, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931, 953 (2016). The
FTC has regulatory oversight over public claims about regulated products. For further discussion
of the role of the FTC with respect to DTC genetic testing companies, see infra note 136. R
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tests (LDTs).22 The FDA’s decision to absent itself from oversight of
LDTs allowed for the rapid development of physician-ordered carrier
tests, such as those for cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs disease. Thus,
when 23andMe burst onto the scene, there were no clear regulatory
mechanisms in place to assess analytical validity,23 clinical validity,24
or clinical utility25 of DTC genetic tests.
B. The FDA’s Precautionary Approach
Faced with the rapid development and marketing of DTC genetic
testing kits against an ambiguous regulatory backdrop, the FDA (with
a few years’ time lag) took a precautionary approach. In 2010, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report
entitled “Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests: Misleading Test Results
Are Further Complicated by Deceptive Marketing and Other Ques-
tionable Practices.”26 As part of its investigation, the GAO sent iden-
tical DNA samples to four DTC genetic testing companies—selected
for being “frequently cited as being credible by the media and in sci-
entific publications”27—and compared their respective results and in-
terpretations with those of genetics experts. The GAO concluded that
the reported test results were “misleading and of little or no practical
use to consumers.”28 Moreover, its investigation uncovered “10 egre-
gious examples of deceptive marketing.”29
In the wake of the GAO’s report, in May and June 2010, the FDA
sent letters to the four largest DTC testing companies, notifying them
that the FDA considered DTC genetic tests to be “medical devices”
22. The FDA has taken various positions on whether and to what extent it can or should
regulate in vitro diagnostics and laboratory developed tests. For further discussion, see infra
notes 74–79 and accompanying text. R
23. Analytical validity concerns whether a genetic test accurately and reliably captures and
conveys the genes for which it is testing. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 1, at 2258; Spector-Bagdady R
& Pike, supra note 21, at 719.
24. Clinical validity concerns whether an association that a DTC genetic testing company
claims exists between a variation and presentation is accurate. See, e.g., Spector-Bagdady & Pike,
supra note 21, at 719. In other words, clinical validity ensures that the identified genetic variant is
predictive of a certain health condition.
25. Clinical utility describes whether the information the genetic test provides is useful in
some fashion or has a “positive impact on a patient’s health and wellbeing.” Audrey Huang,
Who Regulates Genetic Tests?, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR., http://research.policyarchive.org/
9644.pdf (last updated May 30, 2008).
26. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-847T, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC
TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING
AND OTHER QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES (2010).
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
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subject to the FDA’s pre-market approval process.30 The FDA’s letter
to 23andMe recounts how 23andMe failed to respond after the FDA
raised various concerns in a meeting with 23andMe in July 2009.31
Close on the heels of these FDA letters, in July 2010, the House
Committee on Commerce and Energy convened a hearing on DTC
genetic testing. Chairman Representative Henry Waxman did not
mince words, calling for governmental regulation to “ensure the pub-
lic is protected against exaggerated claims, abusive marketing, and
practices that threaten individual health and safety.”32
In November 2013, the FDA took decisive action, sending cease
and desist letters to several DTC genetic testing companies, including
23andMe, ordering them immediately to stop marketing and selling
their health-related genetic testing services.33 The FDA sharply criti-
cized 23andMe for ignoring the analytical validity and clinical validity
requirements the FDA had established for the company’s disease-re-
30. See, e.g., Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evalu-
ation & Safety, to Anne Wojcicki, President & Co-Founder, 23andMe, Inc. (June 10, 2010),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM215240.pdf
[hereinafter FDA June 2010 Letter to 23andMe]; Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Dir. of
Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, to
James Plante, Founder & CEO, Pathway Genomics Corp. (May 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM211875.pdf.
31. FDA June 2010 Letter to 23andMe, supra note 30.
32. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public Health: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
111th Cong. 20, 23 (2010) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on En-
ergy & Commerce).
33. The cease and desist letter to 23andMe reads in relevant part:
This product is a device . . . because it is intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or is
intended to affect the structure or function of the body. For example, your company’s
website . . . markets the PGS for providing “health reports on 254 diseases and condi-
tions,” including categories such as “carrier status,” “health risks,” and “drug re-
sponse,” and specifically as a “first step in prevention” that enables users to “take steps
toward mitigating serious diseases” such as diabetes, coronary heart disease, and breast
cancer. Most of the intended uses for PGS listed on your website . . . are medical device
uses . . . . Most of these uses have not been classified and thus require premarket ap-
proval or de novo classification . . . .
Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir. Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health, to
Anne Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), http:///www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcement
actions/warningletters/2013/ucm376296.htm [hereinafter FDA Nov. 2013 Warning Letter to
23andMe].
Immediately following the FDA’s Warning Letter, a group of plaintiffs filed a class action
against 23andMe alleging “unfair business practices, breach of warranty, and misrepresentations
about the health benefits of 23AndMe’s services.” Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016,
1021 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the class action must be
conducted in arbitration. Id. at 1033.
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lated claims as well as its proposed labeling revisions.34 The FDA also
flagged the potential health consequences that could result from inac-
curate health risk assessments, highlighting in particular how a false
positive BRCA-related assessment of breast or ovarian cancer risk
could lead a patient to undergo prophylactic surgery.35
In response to the FDA’s actions, several DTC genetic testing com-
panies changed their business models to require physician participa-
tion, narrowed their services to offer DNA sequencing without
interpretation and analysis, or ceased operating altogether.36 Consum-
ers of DTC genetic testing companies that offered sequencing but no
longer provided interpretation or analysis could take advantage of
platforms such as OpenSNP, which “markets itself as allowing ‘cus-
tomers of direct-to-customer genetic tests to publish their test results,
find others with similar genetic variation, learn more about their re-
sults, get the latest primary literature on their variants and help scien-
tists find new associations.’”37 While shut down in the United States,
23andMe launched its PGS in the UK in 2014 after working closely
34. The FDA appears to have been willing to allow 23andMe to proceed under the de novo
review regulatory pathway (discussed further below) and possibly to allow classification as a
Class II medical device (also discussed below). According to its letter, the FDA worked “dili-
gently . . . to help [23andMe] comply with regulatory requirements regarding safety and effec-
tiveness and obtain marketing authorization.” FDA Nov. 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe,
supra note 33. Moreover, in 2013, the FDA approved MiSeqDx, a “next-generation [gene] se-
quencing platform,” as a Class II medical device, albeit not one sold directly to consumers. See
Nicholas S. Downing & Joseph S. Ross, Innovation, Risk, and Patient Empowerment: The FDA-
Mandated Withdrawal of 23andMe’s Personal Genome Service, 311 JAMA 793, 793 (2014).
The 23andMe shut-down by the FDA may thus have had as much (or more) to do with the
company’s stonewalling and non-responsiveness than with the FDA’s precautionary approach.
Note in this regard that, after at least fourteen meetings between the FDA and 23andMe and
several years of back-and-forth communication, 23andMe went radio silent for six months (May
2013 until November 2013) leading up to the FDA’s cease-and-desist letter.
35. FDA Nov. 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 21, at 728–30. Color Genomics, ostensibly a
competitor of 23andMe, offers several genetic tests for which 23andMe lacks FDA approval. For
example, Color Genomics tests an individual’s “risk for common cancers and heart conditions.”
See Individuals: Overview, COLOR GENOMICS, https://www.color.com/product/overview (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2019). While an individual ordering one of these tests through Color is not required
to obtain a prescription per se, Color “require[s] that test requisition be approved either by a
patient’s own doctor or by a company-associated physician, and that patients learn about their
results through that doctor or from a genetic counsellor.” Molika Ashford, Episona Adds DTC
Option for Epigenetic Male Infertility Test, Enters Shifting Regulatory Landscape, GENOMEWEB
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/episona-adds-dtc-option-epi
genetic-male-infertility-test-enters-shifting. See also Hereditary Cancer Test, COLOR GENOMICS,
https://www.color.com/product/hereditary-cancer-genetic-test (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (“All
Color tests are ordered by a physician—either your own or an independent physician who can
review your information and order testing on your behalf. . . . Your ordering physician will
automatically get a copy of your test results.”).
37. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 21, at 729.
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with the UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Agency.38
The high-profile 23andMe PGS shutdown in the United States led
to protests that the FDA was being overly cautious and stifling
innovation.39
C. The FDA Changes Course
23andMe seemed to have a reversal of fortune in February 2015,
when the FDA authorized, as a Class II medical device with “special
controls,” marketing of its first DTC genetic test screening for genetic
predisposition to Bloom Syndrome.40 23andMe touted that it was
“[t]he first and only genetic service available directly to individuals in
the United States that includes reports that meet FDA standards for
being scientifically and clinically valid.”41 As part of its premarket
submission to the FDA, 23andMe conducted extensive analytical vali-
dation of its test as well as extensive user-comprehension research.42
In its marketing authorization decision, the FDA specifically noted
that the company submitted scientific evidence of analytic validity as
well as consumer usability evidence establishing that members of the
38. See Samuel Gibbs, DNA-Screening Test 23andMe Launches in UK After US Ban, GUARD-
IAN (Dec. 1, 2014, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/02/google-gene
tic-testing-23andme-uk-launch. Moreover, “British availability won’t be a workaround for
Americans looking to get the benefits of the system—23andMe will only ship to a UK IP address
and a UK shipping address.” Jonah Comstock, Still Facing FDA Opposition in the US, 23andMe
Heads Across the Pond, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/38
662/still-facing-fda-opposition-in-the-us-23andme-heads-across-the-pond/.
39. See, e.g., Robert C. Green & Nita A. Farahany, The FDA is Overcautious on Consumer
Genomics, 505 NATURE 286, 286 (2014) (“[A]s scholars who study how individuals respond to
their own genetic information, we contend that the FDA’s precautionary approach may pose a
greater threat to consumer health than the harms that it seeks to prevent.”); Richard Epstein,
Manhattan Moment: FDA Overreach Has Heavy Costs, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 29, 2013, 12:00
AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/manhattan-moment-fda-overreach-has-heavy-costs/
article/2539939.
40. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEN14004, EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III
DESIGNATION FOR THE 23ANDME PERSONAL GENOME SERVICE CARRIER SCREENING TEST FOR
BLOOM SYNDROME: DECISION SUMMARY (2015), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/re
views/DEN160026.pdf [hereinafter FDA BLOOM SYNDROME DECISION SUMMARY].
41. 23andMe and the FDA, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/
211831908-23andMe-and-the-FDA (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
42. FDA BLOOM SYNDROME DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 5–19 (detailing the re-
sults of two studies, one with human cell line samples and a second with human saliva samples,
conducted to substantiate analytical performance of the test). See also id. at 23–24 (describing a
user comprehension study that addressed the “purpose of the PGS, limitations of the test (vari-
ants covered), relevant ethnicities for the test, meaning of test results, and appropriate follow-up
actions”).
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public were capable of interpreting its test report at a 90% compre-
hension level.43
In April 2017, the FDA authorized 23andMe to market DTC Ge-
netic Health Risk (GHR) tests for genetic predisposition to ten dis-
eases (including Alzheimer’s risk, Parkinson’s disease, and hereditary
thrombophilia) as Class II medical devices, again with “special con-
trols.”44 In 2016, 23andMe had submitted a de novo application for
premarket approval. As part of its submission, 23andMe provided
“data from peer-reviewed, scientific literature that demonstrated a
link between specific genetic variants and each of the 10 health
conditions.”45
43. According to the FDA’s press release noting its approval:
23andMe performed two separate studies to demonstrate that their test is accurate in
detecting Bloom syndrome carrier status. One study conducted at two laboratories
tested a total of 70 unique samples, including samples from known carriers of the dis-
ease. An additional study evaluated 105 samples at the same two laboratories. Both
studies showed equivalent results in detecting carrier status of Bloom syndrome when
the same samples were tested.
The company also conducted a usability study with 302 people not familiar with the
23andMe saliva collection device to demonstrate consumers could understand the test
instructions and collect an adequate saliva sample.
Finally, the company conducted a user study comprised of 667 randomly recruited par-
ticipants representing the U.S. general population in age, gender, race and education
level to show the test instructions and results were easy to follow and understand.
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Carrier Test for Bloom Syndrome (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/news
room/pressannouncements/ucm435003.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20150301075100/http://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm435003.htm].
44. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEN160026, EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III
DESIGNATION FOR THE 23ANDME PERSONAL GENOME SERVICE (PGS) GENETIC HEALTH RISK
TEST FOR HEREDITARY THROMBOPHILIA, ALPHA-1 ANTITRYPSIN DEFICIENCY, ALZHEIMER’S
DISEASE, PARKINSON’S DISEASE, GAUCHER DISEASE TYPE 1, FACTOR XI DEFICIENCY, CELIAC
DISEASE, G6PD DEFICIENCY, HEREDITARY HEMOCHROMATOSIS AND EARLY-ONSET PRIMARY
DYSTONIA: DECISION SUMMARY (2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/reviews/DEN
160026.pdf [hereinafter FDA GHR DECISION SUMMARY].
45. The FDA’s press release elaborated:
Authorization of the 23andMe GHR tests was supported by data from peer-reviewed,
scientific literature that demonstrated a link between specific genetic variants and each
of the 10 health conditions. The published data originated from studies that compared
genetic variants present in people with a specific condition to those without that condi-
tion. The FDA also reviewed studies, which demonstrated that 23andMe GHR tests
correctly and consistently identified variants associated with the 10 indicated conditions
or diseases from a saliva sample.
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer
Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www
.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm [hereinafter FDA DTC
Press Release]. See also FDA GHR DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 44, at 7–28 (detailing the
results from analytical performance studies for each of the 10 health conditions); id. at 28–50
(detailing the clinical studies consulted for each of the 10 health conditions); id. at 50–52
(describing results of user comprehension study conducted by 23andMe finding “average com-
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23andMe had certainly turned over a new leaf in terms of cooperat-
ing and submitting to the FDA premarket clearance process. But was
the FDA likewise signaling a shift in its regulatory approach, perhaps
fueled by a change in presidential administration? Earlier in 2015, the
FDA had announced that it would classify DTC genetic carrier
screens as lower-risk devices, thus opening up a more rapid path to
market for additional genetic tests for additional autosomal recessive
conditions. And in 2017, the FDA announced a further shift to ap-
proving GHR tests on a device-wide basis. Namely, tests for addi-
tional conditions would be exempt from premarket review, provided
the tests meet the requirements of the new GHR category.46
23andMe has continued to ride the wave of favorable momentum.
On March 6, 2018, with surprisingly little fanfare, the FDA authorized
23andMe to market the first cancer health risk test to provide infor-
mation to users on their status with respect to three out of more than
one thousand BRCA1/BRCA2 mutations.47 According to the FDA,
the test report “describes if a woman is at increased risk of developing
breast and ovarian cancer, and if a man is at increased risk of develop-
ing breast cancer or may be at increased risk of developing prostate
cancer.”48 As part of its de novo review application, 23andMe submit-
ted evidence to the FDA that the test accurately identifies the BRCA
genes and it produces reproducible results.49 In the FDA’s press re-
lease, the Acting Director of the Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and
Radiological Health in the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiologi-
prehension rates per core comprehension concept ranged from 73.3% to 100%” and “overall
comprehension score for all concepts across all test reports studied as greater than 90%”).
46. FDA DTC Press Release, supra note 45. See also generally FDA GHR DECISION SUM-
MARY, supra note 44.
47. See Letter from Reena Philip, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Lisa Charter, Dir. Regulatory Affairs & Quality Assurance,
23andMe, Inc. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/DEN170046.pdf;
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEN170046, EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DES-
IGNATION FOR THE 23ANDME PERSONAL GENOME SERVICE (PGS) GENETIC HEALTH RISK RE-
PORT FOR BRCA1/BRCA2 (SELECTED VARIANTS): DECISION SUMMARY (2018), https://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/reviews/DEN170046.pdf [hereinafter FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DE-
CISION SUMMARY].
48. FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 47, at 2.
49. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-
to-Consumer Test That Reports Three Mutations in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes (Mar. 6,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm599560.htm [here-
inafter FDA BRCA Press Release]. See also FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY, supra
note 47, at 4–8 (detailing analytical performance, including precision and reproducibility stud-
ies); id. at 9–11 (describing clinical data and studies relating to BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants); id.
at 12 (noting that “[s]pecific user comprehension studies were not performed to specifically as-
sess the comprehension of the Genetic Health Risk report for BRCA1/BRCA2 (Selected
Variants)”).
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cal Health, explained: “This test provides information to certain indi-
viduals who may be at increased breast, ovarian or prostate cancer
risk and who might not otherwise get genetic screening, and is a step
forward in the availability of DTC genetic tests.”50 But, the Acting
Director cautioned, given the limited amount of information the test
provides, it “should not be used as a substitute for seeing [a] doctor
for cancer screenings or counseling on genetic and lifestyle factors
that can increase or decrease cancer risk.”51
23andMe has also made headway into the field of pharmacogenet-
ics, the study of the link between genetics and patient reaction to
drugs. According to the FDA, “[t]he use of some drugs can be aided
by pharmacogenetic testing; there is sufficient scientific evidence dem-
onstrating a relationship between certain drugs and genetic vari-
ants.”52 On October 31, 2018, the FDA permitted marketing, with
“special controls,” 23andMe’s pharmacogenetic test to detect 33 vari-
ants for multiple genes that may be associated with a patient’s ability
to metabolize drugs.53 According to the Director of the Office of In
Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health, “This test is a step forward
in making information about genetic variants available directly to con-
sumers . . . . We know that consumers are increasingly interested in
genetic information to help make decisions about their health care.”54
At the same time, the Director added the caveat: “This test should be
used appropriately because it does not determine whether a medica-
tion is appropriate for a patient, does not provide medical advice and
does not diagnose any health conditions.”55 As part of its de novo
premarket review application, 23andMe submitted scientific data to
50. FDA BRCA Press Release, supra note 49.
51. Id. These variants are found most often in people of Ashkenazi Jewish descent and “for
non-Ashkenazi women and men, the test would miss more than 99% of all BRCA mutations.”
Robert Resta, 23andMe to Offer BRCA Genetic Testing, but Should I Take This Test?, SWEDISH:
BLOG (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.swedish.org/blog/2018/03/23andme-to-offer-brca-genetic-test
ing-but-should-i-take-this-test.
52. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Jeffrey Shuren, M.D., J.D., Director of the
FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, and Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director of the
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research on Agency’s Warning to Consumers About
Genetic Tests That Claim to Predict Patients’ Responses to Specific Medications (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm624794.htm [hereinafter
Shuren & Woodcock FDA Press Release].
53. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEN180028, EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III
DESIGNATION FOR THE 23ANDME PERSONAL GENOME SERVICE (PGS) PHARMACOGENETIC RE-
PORTS: DECISION SUMMARY (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/reviews/
DEN180028.pdf [hereinafter FDA PHARMACOGENETIC DECISION SUMMARY].
54. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes First Direct-to-Consumer Test
for Detecting Genetic Variants That May Be Associated with Medication Metabolism (Oct. 31,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm624753.htm.
55. Id.
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demonstrate analytical validity as well as user comprehension
studies.56
II. AN EMERGING HYBRID REGULATORY MODEL
FOR DTC GENETIC TESTING
The FDA has recognized the need for regulatory reform and mod-
ernization to accommodate the rapidly changing genetic test land-
scape. Indeed, FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb aims to position the
FDA as a facilitator of laboratory test innovation.57 Moreover, accord-
ing to Gottlieb, “these technologies are also prompting FDA to re-
think our own mandate, and how we enable safe, effective innovation
in this novel area.”58
The FDA has jurisdiction to regulate a medical device—which is
defined broadly in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contri-
vance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . .
which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other condi-
tions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”59
The FDA’s medical device framework under the Medical Device
Amendments to the FDCA was developed in 1976 with traditional,
tangible devices in mind. At that time, few devices were controlled by,
or even incorporated, software. “But by 2006, more than half of all
medical devices on the U.S. market incorporated software.”60 Moreo-
ver, “[t]his shift occurred with very little change in the FDA’s statu-
tory authority or approach to regulating medical devices.”61
56. See FDA PHARMACOGENETIC DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 5–9 (detailing data
submitted to demonstrate analytical performance and reproducibility of studies); id. at 11
(describing user comprehension study results).
57. See generally Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the Ameri-
can Clinical Laboratory Association Annual Meeting (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Speeches/ucm599551 [hereinafter Gottlieb, Remarks at ACLA Annual Meeting].
58. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at Academy Health’s 2018
Health Datapalooza: Transforming the FDA’s Approach to Digital Health (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm605697.htm [hereinafter Gottlieb, Transforming
the FDA’s Approach].
59. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), (h)(2) (2012).
60. Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 61, 77 (2017).
61. Id. Congress’s 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 amended the statutory definition of “de-
vice” to exempt from FDA jurisdiction certain types of software—including software used for
administrative purposes, wellness and lifestyle purposes, patient record purposes, and some
clinical decision support purposes. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o) et seq. (2012 & Supp. V 2018). The
exemption carves out clinical decision support software unless the professional using it cannot
“independently review” the basis for its recommendations and the professional is intended to
rely on the recommendation as a primary point for diagnosing or treating a specific patient. See
id. § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL AND PATIENT DECISION
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The traditional medical device model for regulating genetic testing
rests upon expert knowledge and structural elements of the health
care system. It would seem to fit the traditional setting whereby a phy-
sician, with a patient-provider relationship, orders clinically indicated
genetic testing. Thereafter, licensed, board-certified medical genetic
counselors interpret and deliver the results to the patient.
The FDA, however, is moving away from the traditional “protec-
tive” medical device regulatory model. As Commissioner Gottlieb
explained:
The old posture at the FDA is we have all the authority we need,
and we can adapt our current review processes to whatever new
technology comes about. So if it meets the definition of [a] medical
device, we can somehow apply the 510(k) [pre-market clearance
based on “substantial equivalence” to existing predicate device on
the market] construct to it.62
Moreover, he continued, “I think what you are hearing now from
FDA is a clearer recognition that even if we could do that, and we
tried to do that in the past, it’s probably not the right thing to do.”63
At the same time, notwithstanding its endorsement of the promise
of technological innovation unencumbered by overly burdensome reg-
ulations, the FDA has not embraced full stop the consumer-based lib-
ertarian model that focuses instead on patient autonomy and
empowerment. Instead, we see the emergence of a new hybrid model:
a flexible regulatory paradigm beginning to take shape.
A. The Traditional “Protective” Medical Device Model
The FDA has regulatory authority over all medical devices, which it
classifies according to risk, with correspondingly stringent levels of
SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION STAFF 7–8 (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulation
andguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm587819.pdf. The new definition exempts software intended
to transfer, store, or display data from patient records, laboratory tests, or other device inputs,
unless it is “intended to interpret or analyze” these data. See id. § 360j(o)(1)(C)–(D). The new
definition, however, does not exempt most software that processes, interprets, or analyzes data
from medical images, in vitro diagnostics, clinical laboratory tests, or signal and pattern acquisi-
tion systems. See id. § 360j(o)(1)(D)–(E). Thus, as Nathan Cortez points out, “predictive analyt-
ics that generate customized treatment recommendations might qualify as medical ‘devices’
subject to FDA review.” Cortez, supra note 60, at 75. Moreover, the “FDA can, through notice-
and-comment in the Federal Register, assert jurisdiction over software that would otherwise be
exempt if the agency finds that it ‘would be reasonably likely to have serious adverse health
consequences.’” Cortez, supra note 60, at 76 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)).
62. FDA Should Facilitate Lab Test Innovation, Craft Long-Term Regulatory Overhaul, Got-
tlieb Says at ACLA, GENOMEWEB (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.genomeweb.com/regulatory-news/
fda-should-facilitate-lab-test-innovation-craft-long-term-regulatory-overhaul#.Wxv_KlMvwWr.
63. Id.
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regulatory oversight. More specifically, under the 1976 Medical De-
vice Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA, the FDA sets premarket
clearance or approval requirements for manufacturers by placing de-
vices into one of three categories based on the health risks associated
with their use: Class I, low-risk devices subject to general controls;64
Class II, medium-risk devices subject to special controls; and Class III,
high-risk devices subject to premarket approval.
Class III medical devices “present[ ] a potential unreasonable risk
of illness or injury” or are “purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health.”65 Such de-
vices are subject to the FDA’s premarket approval (PMA) process, a
rigorous process that requires the manufacturer to submit substantial
data to provide “reasonable assurance” to the FDA that its device is
safe and effective for its intended use before introducing it to the
market.66
The MDA also outlined a “grandfathering” process for devices al-
ready on the market as of 1976; and it thus provided for a streamlined
pre-market notification (PMN) process (also called the 510(k) process
after the then-existing statutory provision) for devices that are “sub-
stantially equivalent” to pre-existing devices.67 This streamlined PMN
process loosely resembles the streamlined pathway for generic drugs
(known as the Abbreviated New Drug Application) that can rely on
“bioequivalence” with approved brand-name drugs (which must sub-
64. General controls typically associated with Class I medical devices include registration, list-
ing, current good manufacturing practice, and medical device reporting.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (2012).
66. See e.g., id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(i) (noting, inter alia, that a Class III device is one that “(I)
cannot be classified as a class I device because insufficient information exists to determine that
the application of general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device, and (II) cannot be classified as a class II device because insufficient
information exists to determine that the special controls described in subparagraph (B) would
provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness”) (emphasis added); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e et seq. (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (describing certain PMA requirements); 21 C.F.R. § 814 et
seq. (2018) (elaborating on PMA requirements).
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the MDA to the FDCA pre-
empted state law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims involving a medical device that had
undergone rigorous FDA pre-approval scrutiny. 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008). Riegel certainly
narrows (but does not entirely foreclose) the scope of state law claims of allegedly defective
FDA-approved Class III medical devices that can withstand a federal preemption challenge. See
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359, 362–69 (2014) (elaborating upon the “new (or resurrected) species of
tort claims” that have arisen “in the shadow of preemption” enforcing state requirements that
are “parallel” to federal statutory schemes).
67. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1)(A)(ii), 360c(i) (2012).
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mit a full New Drug Application with clinical trial evidence) to enter
the market once patent protection ends.68
In Vitro Diagnostics (IVDs) are defined as:
[T]hose reagents, instruments, and systems intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including a determination
of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent
disease or its sequelae. Such products are intended for use in the
collection, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from
the human body.69
IVDs are regulated like other medical devices. That is, the FDA classi-
fies them as Class I, II, or III depending on its determination of what
kind of scientific data and additional controls are required to ensure
safety and effectiveness.70 A device that is not substantially equivalent
to a pre-1976 device is classified by statute into Class III without any
FDA rulemaking proceedings.
When it comes to genetic testing, the potential targets of the FDA’s
regulatory reach include: (1) the container in which the DNA is held
or shipped to the lab; (2) the device that is reading the DNA (e.g., the
actual machine as well as the reagents or chemicals that allow it to
work); (3) the laboratory conducting the tests; (4) the tests used to
demonstrate testing validity; and (5) the software that translates raw
read-outs into comprehensible medical information.71 The FDA’s pre-
68. Compare id. § 360c(i)(1), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2012). For discussion of the implica-
tions for federal preemption of state tort law, see Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends
for FDA Preemption of State Products Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 415, 422–23 (2008)
(“The contrast between FDA’s PMA process (at issue in Riegel) and its premarket notification
process (at issue in Lohr) is twofold. Premarket notification is a streamlined process, which is
completed in an average of 20 hours (as compared to the PMA’s 1,200-hour average). So, mea-
sured by average manpower hours, this type of regulatory review is sixty times more lax. Even
more germane is the distinction the Court draws between the FDA’s premarket notification
‘equivalence’ review, which essentially ‘grandfathers’ devices that are equivalent to those ex-
isting on the market at the time of the MDA’s enactment, versus the full-blown PMA ‘safety’
review.”).
69. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2018).
70. See Overview of IVD Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Medi
calDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/ucm123682.htm (last up-
dated July 9, 2018).
71. Companies seeking FDA approval of their IVDs may also be required to obtain Investiga-
tional Device Exemptions (IDE) in order to perform clinical investigations. It is through IDEs
that the FDA may regulate, to a certain degree, genetic testing research studies. NGS companies
fear that the FDA may unnecessarily interject itself into such studies. It seems, however, that
NGS companies are in the clear subject to the following constraint:
In deciding whether FDA can regulate research, there is a crucial legal distinction be-
tween sequencing people’s genes for general genetic and biomedical research purposes
(for example, to study which variants appear in the human genome, or to study the
medical significance of specific gene variants, or to study optimal procedures for com-
municating and utilizing genetic information in clinical settings, or to study the psycho-
logical impact of genetic disclosures on patients) versus sequencing people’s genes in
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rogative to regulate (1)–(3) is relatively uncontroversial. As to (1) and
(2), the FDA has authority to regulate these as medical devices or
“other similar or related article[s].”72 As to (3), IVDs are subject to
CLIA, which “establishes quality standards for laboratory testing and
an accreditation program for clinical laboratories,” based on the com-
plexity of the tests performed.73
A key controversial question had been whether a genetic test is an
IVD subject to FDA regulation or instead a Laboratory Developed
Test (LDT) subject to the FDA’s “homebrew” exception. While all
LDTs are IVDs, the FDA has traditionally exercised “enforcement
discretion” with respect to LDTs.74 LDTs were initially exempt from
FDA regulation because the FDA viewed them as straightforward
tests conducted largely in-house at research labs.75 Whereas IVDs can
be sold to laboratories, hospitals, clinics, or directly to patients, LDTs
are technically for research purposes only, and are created and ex-
order to study the analytical and clinical performance characteristics of the sequencing
technology itself.
Barbara J. Evans, The Limits of FDA’s Authority to Regulate Clinical Research Involving High-
Throughput DNA Sequencing, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259, 263 (2015).
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012) (“The term device . . . means an instrument, apparatus,
implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man . . . or . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man . . . .”).
73. Overview of IVD Regulation, supra note 70. States and CMS also play roles in regulating
testing laboratories. A state can exempt its labs by demonstrating that it meets or goes beyond
what CLIA requires, and CMS (at least in the FDA’s view) plays a role complementary to that
of the FDA. Whereas the FDA regulates clinical and analytic validity, CMS ensures clinical
utility primarily, and analytical validity to a lesser extent in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Dis-
cussion Paper on Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVi-
troDiagnostics/LaboratoryDevelopedTests/UCM536965.pdf [hereinafter FDA, Discussion Paper
on LDTs]; see also CLIA Overview, CMS.GOV (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/LDT-and-CLIA_FAQs.pdf.
74. See e.g., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 16. Al-
though the FDA (and some commentators) view the FDA as having clear statutory authority to
regulate LDTs, others disagree. Compare Evans et al., supra note 1, at 2258 (“Skeptics raise
important concerns, but there is little doubt that the FDA has ample power to impose at least
some new regulatory requirements on genomic testing—enough, in any event, to make labora-
tory directors squirm.”), and Palmer, supra note 13, at 512, with, e.g., PAUL D. CLEMENT &
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CAN-
NOT BE REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES (2015), http://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf, and Patricia Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism,
92 IND. L.J. 845, 890–92 (2017).
75. Laboratory Developed Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/LaboratoryDevelopedTests/default
.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2018) (“The FDA has generally not enforced premarket review and
other applicable FDA requirements because LDTs were relatively simple lab tests and generally
available on a limited basis.”).
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amined within a single lab.76 Traditionally exempt from FDA regula-
tion, LDTs create what some have called a “regulatory black hole.”77
But regardless of the status of LDT tests as exempt from FDA
regulation:78
The FDA has made clear that DTC tests do not fall within that
[LDT enforcement discretion] policy, which means that manufactur-
ers of such tests are subject to enforcement action if they do not
submit information about their tests to the FDA for premarket re-
view and do not comply with other FDA regulatory controls, even if
they otherwise would be considered LDTs.79
B. The Consumer-Based “Libertarian” Critique
In recent years, there has been increasing backlash against the
FDA’s protective medical device regulatory model. Richard Epstein
has long bemoaned the heavy hand of the risk-averse FDA in the
traditional realms of medical device and drug regulation. Epstein has
advocated a laissez-faire approach that would liberate such medical
products from upstream regulatory control and place control down-
stream in the hands of physicians who can make individual-based as-
sessments.80 But he has been joined more recently by liberal critics,
highlighting the potential suffocating effect of regulation on technol-
ogy-fueled innovation.
Stephan Landsman and Michael Saks argue in a forthcoming book
that the medical model innovates too slowly because of regulation as
well as professional resistance to new practices.81 The authors use the
76. See Palmer, supra note 13, at 498, 500–01.
77. See Bruce Patsner, New “Home Brew” Predictive Genetic Tests Present Significant Regula-
tory Problems, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 237, 239 (2009).
78. In 2014, the FDA issued draft guidance on the regulation of LDTs, which was subse-
quently shelved. In January 2017, however, the FDA issued a discussion paper addressing the
feedback it had received on its 2014 document and offered some insight into how the FDA is
thinking about LDT regulation. FDA, Discussion Paper on LDTs, supra note 73. As detailed
therein, the FDA asserts: (1) it can regulate LDTs; (2) it plans to take a risk-based approach to
LDT oversight; (3) it may outsource some of the work; and (4) it will implement LDT regulation
over a few years, grandfathering in many LDTs currently on the market. See id.
79. See, e.g., Nancy K. Stade et al., FDA Challenges Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests,
LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:47 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/772679/fda-challenges-di
rect-to-consumer-genetic-tests.
80. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should
Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, Rational Basis
Review and FDA Regulation: Why the Two Do Not Mix, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2016);
Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and
Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 741 (2005).
81. STEPHAN LANDSMAN & MICHAEL J. SAKS, CLOSING DEATH’S DOOR: LEGAL INNOVA-
TIONS TO STEM THE EPIDEMIC OF HEALTHCARE HARM (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1) (on
file with DePaul L. Rev.) (examining medicine’s resistance to technological steps that have the
potential to enable patients to make decisions and to provide a check on unsafe practices).
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case study of 23andMe and the FDA to illustrate the medical estab-
lishment’s resistance to the provision of medical information directly
to consumers and the potential of such a practice to alter the balance
between medical professionals and the recipients of medical care.
They claim that medical professionals are overly concerned with pre-
serving their own authority and revenue streams.82 Moreover, they
charge that the empirical evidence simply does not support the exag-
gerated concerns about consumer anxiety or negative changes in
health behavior.83 Of particular relevance here, they challenge the
FDA’s role, chastising its “rigorous use of governmental regulatory
powers to curtail the flow of such information.”84 Moreover, they de-
cry that the “professional establishment’s primary strategy in its effort
to retain control will be calls for regulation by the FDA and other
government agencies.”85
Proponents of the libertarian model tout its potential to promote
preventative and individualized medicine, while simultaneously reduc-
ing costs to individuals and the health care system. Their vision is
populated by patient consumers, engaged with online social media
platforms, with an ability to respond voluntarily to follow-up surveys
82. Id. at 488 (“A good bit of doctors’ anxiety about information technology perhaps finds its
basis in this threat to upend traditional bases of treatment and devalue doctors’ substantial in-
vestments in their training in the art of medicine.”).
83. Id. at 475 (“The alleged risks that justified this level of protection were the speculative
possibilities of consumer anxiety and a heightened level of requests for medical advice. Direct-
to-consumer delivery of healthcare information was perceived as so threatening that a solution
akin to a death sentence was proposed for the activity.”); id. at 480–81 (“Medicine’s tools in its
holding action against change will include claims that supplying information directly to patients
will cause anxiety and that patients are incompetent to manage the necessary response. Those
claims will not, generally, wait for empirical evidence before advancing armed only with anec-
dote and supposition.”); id. at 474 (“While the authors [of a JAMA article sharply criticizing
DTC genetic testing] saw no need to shore up the empirical basis for their criticisms, they were
at pains to stress the substantial empirical burden that should be imposed on direct-to-consumer
companies.”).
In 2011, Scripps Research Institute surveyed individuals before and after accessing a DTC
testing product; the study reported “no significant differences in the level of anxiety, dietary fat
intake, or exercise behavior between baseline and follow-up for the sample as whole.” Cinna-
mon S. Bloss et al., Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Genomewide Profiling to Assess Disease Risk,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 529 (2011). A subsequent 2013 study found that 24.6% of DTC
genetic testing customers reported a change in levels of anxiety—and of these, 85.3% claimed
their anxiety was reduced. Corin Egglestone et al., Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests on
Health Behaviour and Anxiety: A Survey of Consumers and Potential Consumers, 22 J. GENETIC
COUNSELING 565, 565 (2013).
84. LANDSMAN & SAKS, supra note 81, at 474–75.
85. Id. at 481.
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and health reports in order to interpret raw data.86 It is a vision ena-
bled by the information technology revolution in medicine.87
C. The FDA’s Hybrid Model: Flexible Regulatory Paradigm
The FDA has launched “Innovation Pathway 2.0,” a series of initia-
tives designed to promote the development of breakthrough devices
by reducing the timeline and cost of generating safety and efficacy
data.88 In a 2018 public workshop, the FDA Director of the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health bemoaned that the FDA’s standard
of reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness is “one of the high-
est standards in the world [and] it often entails the generation of much
more evidence . . . that can create disincentives for innovators to bring
their technologies to the US early, if at all.”89 And FDA Commis-
sioner Gottlieb has sounded a consistent theme:
[W]e must also recognize that FDA’s usual approach to medical
product regulation is not always well suited to emerging technolo-
gies like digital health, or the rapid pace of change in this area. If we
want American patients to benefit from innovation, FDA itself must
be as nimble and innovative as the technologies we’re regulating.90
There is a recognition that the existing traditional regulatory regime
for medical devices and pharmaceutical drugs may not be right for
genetic testing (regulated either as IVDs or LDTs).91 The FDA is em-
bracing “flexible regulatory paradigms”: “The idea is rather than take
technologies and put them down in cookie cutter pathways, design the
regulatory paradigm around the technology. What are its unique evi-
86. Id. at 480 (advocating that “[p]atients [be] empowered to become the assessors of their
own condition and collectors of critical information about it”).“The direct-to-consumer genetic
testing story provides important lessons for efforts to disseminate information to customers that
can put them in charge of monitoring their health and addressing potential problems.” Id.
87. See generally ERIC TOPOL, THE PATIENT WILL SEE YOU NOW (2015) (crediting improve-
ments in information technology that will sidestep professional control and empower patients to
pursue and secure better and safer care on their own initiative).
88. See Innovation Pathway, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHInnovation/InnovationPath
way/default.htm (last updated Aug. 18, 2016).
89. Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Remarks at Fostering Digital Health Innovation: Developing the Software Precertification Pro-
gram Public Workshop 11 (Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Shuren, Remarks at Fostering Digital
Health Innovation] (transcript available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM600093.pdf).
90. Gottlieb, Transforming the FDA’s Approach, supra note 58.
91. Cf., e.g., Cortez, supra note 60, at 81 (“If predictive analytics does not fit well into existing
frameworks governing medical products, medical professionals, or medical information, what
would a more appropriate framework look like? There is a fair bit of skepticism of traditional
regulation by traditional regulators; conversely, there is a fair bit of optimism in private certifiers
and technology-enabled intermediation.”).
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dence generation needs, patient access needs, innovation cycles?”92
Increasingly,
[i]t seems clear that the emerging regulatory system will need to
develop a hybrid strategy that includes some aspects of the respon-
sibility of medical information providers to ensure the quality of
their information, their responsibility to facilitate user comprehen-
sion and interpretation of test results, the freedom of consumers to
order testing on their own initiative, and the expectation that data
will be managed appropriately.93
The first of three pillars of the FDA’s more flexible regulatory
model is greater use of the so-called expedited de novo process for
regulatory approval of DTC genetic tests.94 Introduced as part of the
2012 Food and Drug Safety and Innovation Act, the “direct de novo”
process allows medical device sponsors to submit a de novo applica-
tion in the first instance without submitting a prior 510(k) “substantial
equivalent” application.95 It is a preclearance regulatory pathway de-
signed for novel, low-to-moderate risk devices for which there is no
existing predicate on the market.
In 2016, the FDA issued a guidance document entitled “Factors to
Consider When Making Benefit-Risk Determinations in Medical De-
vice Premarket Approval and De Novo Classifications.”96 The FDA’s
de novo review process is still somewhat in flux. Regulatory expecta-
tions for DTC genetic testing companies are patterned after the
92. Shuren, Remarks at Fostering Digital Health Innovation, supra note 89, at 11.
93. DTC Testing 2.0, supra note 5, at 119.
94. The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 created the de novo process—an expedited review
process for low to moderate risk devices that could bypass the PMA process, even without sub-
stantially equivalent predicates on the market. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-
2011-D-0689, DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III
DESIGNATION): GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4
(2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm080197.pdf [hereinafter FDA 2017 DE NOVO GUIDANCE] (describing
the creation and nature of the de novo process in 1997). The 2012 Food and Drug Safety and
Innovation Act built on the earlier 1997 de novo initiative.
95. See, e.g., id. (creating “an alternative mechanism for submitting a De Novo request that
does not require that a device be reviewed first under a 510(k) and found NSE [not substantially
equivalent] prior to submission of a De Novo request”). While 2012 marked the final Congres-
sional action to date on de novo review, the FDA has continued to refine the process. In 2017,
the FDA finalized a guidance document (originally issued in draft form in 2014) entitled “De
Novo Classification Process (Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation)” that seeks to clar-
ify which kinds of information device sponsors need to submit to help ensure the success of their
de novo application. See id.
96. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-D-0577, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN MAKING BENEFIT-RISK DE-
TERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET APPROVAL AND DE NOVO CLASSIFICATIONS 4
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Gui
danceDocuments/UCM517504.pdf [hereinafter FDA 2016 DE NOVO GUIDANCE].
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FDA’s April 2017 market authorization of 23andMe’s Genetic Health
Risk (GHR) tests, which were submitted under the direct de novo
process.97
The second pillar is a new genetic testing approval pathway for
GHR tests that the FDA announced in November 2017. FDA Com-
missioner Gottlieb has advocated for the creation of a precertification
program for diagnostics: “In the setting of these DTC tests, we real-
ized that if we had enough confidence in the validity of the lab’s un-
derlying system, we could exempt from premarket review many
individual tests that met pre-specified standards.”98 Building on the
proposed firm-based, pre-certification model that the FDA developed
for digital health technologies,99 it allows “manufacturers of these
types of [GHR] tests . . . to come to FDA for a one-time review to
ensure that they meet the FDA’s requirements, after which they [can]
enter the market with new GHR tests without further review.”100 As
FDA Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health
elaborated:
In 2017 [the FDA] put out an approach for direct to consumer ge-
netic health risk tests . . . . [The FDA] essentially said you have
these tests . . . rather than coming in for every single claim, if the
developer comes to us once with one claim and can show they meet
expectations for demonstrating their accuracy and identifying the
relevant genetic variance, that they are meeting expectations in as-
sessing the clinical evidence to support the claim, and they can con-
duct good user comprehension studies, thereafter they don’t come
back to [the FDA].101
The third pillar of the new hybrid approach is third-party accredita-
tion, which Commissioner Gottlieb has touted as “designed to reduce
the burden on test developers and streamline the regulatory assess-
97. See Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation (De Novo) Summaries, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTo
bacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm232269.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2019) (listing current
de novo applications as well as those that have been approved).
98. Gottlieb, Remarks at ACLA Annual Meeting, supra note 57.
99. As Gottlieb explained:
The goal of this [digital health technologies] program is to develop a tailored and prag-
matic framework that trusts the excellence of organizations, but also continually veri-
fies the safety, effectiveness, and performance of software as a medical device. It
leverages the transparency of a sponsor’s culture of quality and its evidence of organi-
zational excellence.
Gottlieb, Transforming the FDA’s Approach, supra note 58.
100. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb, M.D., on Implementation of Agency’s Streamlined Development and Review Pathway
for Consumer Tests That Evaluate Genetic Health Risk (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583885.htm.
101. Shuren, Remarks at Fostering Digital Health Innovation, supra note 89, at 19.
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ment of eligible innovative projects.”102 The FDA recently accredited
the New York State Department of Health as a third-party reviewer
of certain IVDs.103 In announcing the accreditation, Commissioner
Gottlieb explained that it was “another example of [ ] the FDA [ ]
working to find creative and flexible approaches to regulation that
spurs development and efficient delivery of innovative technology.”104
III. EVALUATING THE FDA’S DUAL ROLE AS SAFETY AND
HEALTH INFORMATION REGULATOR
The FDA has reached a critical juncture for institutional design and
regulatory control over DTC genetic testing. Under the recently pro-
posed Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act (Act), DTC genetic
tests classified as in vitro clinical tests (IVCTs) would not be regulated
as devices, drugs, or biologics, but would instead constitute a “new
category and regulatory structure” under the FDCA.105 IVCT over-
sight would be segmented by agency and by function: (1) the FDA’s
oversight would be limited to development and manufacturing; (2)
CMS would regulate laboratory operations; and (3) the states along
with health care professionals and related medical consultants would
oversee medical use and interpretation.
Reform efforts such as the recently proposed Act, which would
largely remove the FDA from regulating medical diagnostic informa-
tion, should be resisted on two separate (albeit related) grounds. First,
the FDA has signaled its commitment to its role as safety regulator in
the emerging hybrid regulatory model for DTC genetic testing. The
FDA’s prime raison d’eˆtre is to protect public health and safety.106
This is indeed significant, but it is not the whole story. This conven-
tional view of the FDA fails to appreciate the second important role
102. Gottlieb, Remarks at ACLA Annual Meeting, supra note 57.
103. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Unveils a Streamlined Path for the Au-
thorization of Tumor Profiling Tests Alongside Its Latest Product Action (Nov. 15, 2017), https://
www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm585347.htm.
104. Id. This third-party accreditation mirrors the third-party certification for digital health
technology mentioned in Gottlieb’s newest budget proposal. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Administration’s Request
for New FDA Funding to Promote Innovation and Broaden Patient Access Through Competi-
tion (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm596554
.htm.
105. The Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act: Advancing Innovation and Safety for Pa-
tients in Diagnostics, HOUSE.GOV, https://bucshon.house.gov/sites/bucshon.house.gov/files/docu
ments/daia%20summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
106. What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/
(last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
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that FDA regulation plays in promoting innovation by incentivizing
the generation of credible information about medical products.107
In this Part, after exploring the role of the FDA as safety regulator,
I turn to the argument in favor of the FDA’s regulation of DTC ge-
netic testing on information production grounds.108 I explore the
FDA’s role as a regulator of health information, responsible for as-
pects of its quality, creation, interpretation, delivery, protection, and
implications. If DTC genetic testing is subject to FDA oversight, the
agency will ensure that the tests are analytically accurate and reliable
and that companies’ claims are truthful and not misleading—all of
which requires substantiation via scientific data and clinical trials.
A. The FDA as Safety Regulator
In the current deregulatory climate, it is hardly a surprise that the
FDA has signaled a policy shift away from the protective medical de-
vice regulatory model. What is perhaps more surprising is its insis-
tence on keeping its regulatory hand in oversight of DTC genetic
tests.109 The FDA has consistently maintained that “since 2012 our
strategic priorities have been focused around how we can sufficiently
reduce the time and cost of the total product enterprise and life cycle
such that innovators view the US marketplace more favorably, but not
107. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007).
108. Potentially harsh trade-offs arise in this particular context, namely whether “[l]ooser ac-
cess restrictions will enhance data quality in the long term by increasing the number of partici-
pants willing and able to share DNA and information—but at the risk of misinforming and
harming individuals in the meantime.” Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic Semicommons, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1001, 1032 (2015).
109. Indeed, in prior writings, now-FDA Commissioner Gottlieb signaled a more deregulatory
approach. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, FDA Fear of Printed Word Threatens Our Health, AEI (Dec.
11, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/fda-fear-of-the-printed-word-threatens-our-health (“Li-
censing schemes like FDA’s are ordinarily reserved for high-risk products. Most other products
in commerce are regulated, if at all, by government rules addressing reliability and self-test-
ing. . . . Congress should consider a similar method when it comes to new tech medical informa-
tion tools like consumer gene tests, medical apps, and clinical decision software.”); see also Scott
Gottlieb, Will Regulation Thwart the Personalization of Medicine?, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK,
Oct. 2010, at 1–2, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2010-10-No-3-g.pdf (“[W]hen
it comes to safety, the [molecular diagnostics] industry has a fairly good track record. If the FDA
steps in to impose regulations that are too costly, time consuming, or burdensome, it could stall
much of the investment and entrepreneurship that have fueled recent innovations.”); id. at 5
(“[T]he increased regulatory costs and time involved in satisfying the PMA process[ ] will dis-
courage investors from making new bets on diagnostics. . . . If the costs of developing diagnostics
continue to rise, and if the FDA regulates diagnostics using a scheme meant to regulate drugs,
investing in many of these endeavors simply becomes unviable. . . . By requiring a PMA trial, the
FDA will stifle the market framework that helps drive education and the adoption of tests
among clinicians.”); id. at 7–8 (“The question is how much innovation we are willing to trade in
exchange for greater certainty about the performance of the resulting tests.”).
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sacrifice that standard of reasonable assurance of safety and effective-
ness.”110 More specifically, according to FDA Commissioner Gottlieb:
“While [DTC genetic tests] can offer significant amounts of personal
risk information, they’re not without their own risks—especially if
they provide consumers with incorrect or misleading information that
may be used to make health choices without considering the advice of
a medical professional.”111 Thus, “[i]n its consideration of [DTC ge-
netic] tests, the FDA seeks to strike a balance that provides for an
efficient pathway to bring these tests to consumers, without sacrificing
the assurances offered by FDA oversight.”112
The key distinction between unregulated LDTs and DTC genetic
tests, which the FDA brought under its regulatory purview, is the ab-
sence of a physician as learned intermediary. One of the FDA’s chief
concerns regarding unregulated DTC genetic tests is that consumers
may act on incorrect information to the detriment of their health and
safety. DTC genetic tests pose three distinct risks to health and safety:
(1) incorrect test results; (2) incorrect interpretation of test results;
and (3) incorrect action based on test results.113 A study by Ambry
110. Shuren, Remarks at Fostering Digital Health Innovation, supra note 89, at 11.
111. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb, M.D., on Implementation of Agency’s Streamlined Development and Review Pathway
for Consumer Tests That Evaluate Genetic Health Risks (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583885.htm.
112. Id.
113. DTC genetic tests might pose additional risks such as the emotional impact of test results
upon consumers. See Gina Kolata, The Online Gene Test Finds a Dangerous Mutation. It May
Well Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/health/gene-
testing-disease-nyt.html; Gina Kolata, When Reporting on Mail-In Genetic Testing Comes Home,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/insider/23andme-genetic-testing-
disorders.html. Various studies have sought to better understand how consumers use and inter-
nalize DTC genetic test information. See, e.g., J. Scott Roberts & Jenny Ostergren, Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing and Personal Genomics Services: A Review of Recent Empirical Stud-
ies, 1 CURRENT GENETIC MED. REP. 182, 185–86 (2013). Suffice it to say, there is no consensus
on this issue; nor does it form the crux of the FDA’s case for regulation.
DTC genetic testing raises significant privacy concerns—which I am putting aside for purposes
of this Article—that provide additional grounds for opposing a market-driven libertarian re-
sponse. Indeed, de-identified genetic data apparently can be re-identified. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai,
Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical Data Silos, 92 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1641, 1652 n.59 (2017) (collecting studies). The increased use of biometrics as
privacy mechanisms, moreover, heightens the risk that criminals might seek to obtain this infor-
mation. See Andelka Phillips & Jan Charbonneau, Am. Fed. Trade Comm’n’s PrivacyCon, Pres-
entation: Giving Away More Than Your Genome Sequence?: Privacy in the Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing Space (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/
2015/10/00057-98101.pdf.
A further danger is the possibility of discrimination resulting from genetic test results. A hand-
ful of statutes have been passed at the state and federal level to address this. See, e.g., Rebecca S.
Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 26 n.148, 35 n.199 (2017). Nevertheless, loopholes apparently still exist.
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Genetics (published in Genetics in Medicine) found that about 40% of
variants reported in raw data from DTC genetic tests may be
wrong.114
With respect to incorrect test results, the FDA wants to guard
against both false positive results and false negative results. “False
positive results may prompt unnecessary additional testing, . . . could
lead to unnecessary therapies (e.g., inappropriate prophylactic ther-
apy or dietary restriction)[, could] . . . cause or enhance anxiety or
depression[, or could cause users to] . . . make inappropriate lifestyle
changes.”115 Such false positives can pose serious morbidity and mor-
tality risks. For example, with respect to the BRCA1/BRCA2 test,
“[f]alse positive results could subject patients to morbidity and mortal-
ity due to earlier and more frequent radiological screening and/or un-
necessary surgery or medications . . . or erroneous entry into clinical
investigations of cancer prevention.”116 Moreover, “[t]o avoid passing
the variants to their children, some users could make inappropriate
reproductive choices or receive unnecessary prenatal testing, which
may include amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling. Such invasive
procedures carry a risk of spontaneous abortion.”117
See, e.g., Gregory Katz & Stuart O. Schweitzer, Implications of Genetic Testing for Health Policy,
10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 92, 108 (2010).
To date, the FTC has been more attuned to privacy implications than the FDA. Compare
Lesley Fair, DNA Test Kits: Consider the Privacy Implications, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: CON-
SUMER INFO.  (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/12/dna-test-kits-consider-
privacy-implications (“We’ve brought dozens of cases challenging deceptive or unfair practices
related to consumer privacy and data security—including a settlement with a business that sold
products based on at-home genetic testing, but allegedly failed to provide reasonable security for
consumers’ personal information.”), with FDA GHR DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 44, at 59
(“The risks associated with genetic privacy violation are mitigated by the manufacturer provid-
ing a privacy statement on their website.”), and FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY,
supra note 47, at 19 (repeating the same boilerplate sentence).
114. This study was based on 49 cases that came to Ambry for confirmation testing between
January 2014 and December 2017, largely for testing of cancer genes. Some DTC genetic testing
firms give consumers their raw genotyping data; consumers can then send for additional testing if
DTC results indicate they harbor a disease-linked variant. Two out of every five samples sent to
Ambry for confirmation testing were false positives.
115. FDA GHR DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 44, at 55–56. The FDA noted that these
issues were mitigated, in part, by virtue of (a) labeling that “recommend[s] . . . consulting health-
care professionals, genetic counselors, board-certified clinical molecular geneticist[s], or [the]
equivalent” and (b) the fact that “[h]ealthcare professionals routinely review a patient’s personal
and family medical history and perform physical examinations before ordering additional diag-
nostic tests.” Id. at 58 tbl.
116. FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 47, at 14. “False positive results
could also unnecessarily cause or enhance anxiety or depression. If the false positive results are
associated with diseases with significant morbidity or mortality, the users may develop severe
anxiety, depression or make inappropriate lifestyle changes.” Id.
117. Id.
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False negative results “can delay the identification of genetic
risk[s].”118 With respect to the BRCA1/BRCA2 test, “[f]alse negative
results could lead to inappropriate follow-up, premature death and/or
severe morbidity. Users receiving a false negative result may fail to
initiate known effective preventive measures including appropriate
lifestyle changes, risk reducing surgery, therapeutic options and/or
targeted surveillance.”119 Whereas the existence of the physician inter-
mediary may mitigate certain false positive risks, the same cannot be
said for false negatives which may never be presented to a physician.
Certain of the tests implicate heightened risk of incorrect interpre-
tation of test results. For example, the BRCA1/BRCA2 test reports
only on three mutations commonly found in individuals of Ashkenazi
Jewish descent, but there are over 1,000 BRCA mutations identified
that are associated with increased risk of developing cancer. Thus, as
the FDA has recognized, “users may misinterpret negative results
from the report to indicate that they are negative for all variants in the
BRCA1/BRCA2 genes.”120 Moreover, removing the physician as
learned intermediary, available to interpret results or detect errors,
increases the risk and harm of such errors.121
The FDA’s hybrid approach embraces direct consumer access to
some types of health-related genetic information while maintaining
stricter regulatory oversight over diagnostic and other more clearly
medical results. The FDA seems to be forging a distinction between
“diagnostic” tests and those showing a genetic predisposition. While
the FDA has not been clear on what constitutes a diagnostic test, it
has suggested that diagnostic tests are “tests [that] are often used as
the sole basis for major treatment decisions.”122 In a press release
describing its April 2017 approval of 23andMe’s GHR tests, the FDA
elaborated:
Excluded from today’s marketing authorization and any future, re-
lated exemption are GHR tests that function as diagnostic tests. Di-
agnostic tests are often used as the sole basis for major treatment
decisions, such as a genetic test for BRCA, for which a positive re-
118. FDA GHR DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 44, at 56.
119. FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 47, at 14.
120. Id. at 15.
121. See, e.g., Diane R. Koeller et al., Utilization of Genetic Counseling After Direct-To-Con-
sumer Genetic Testing: Findings from the Impact of Personal Genomics (PGen) Study, 26 J. GE-
NETIC COUNSELING 1270 (2017); see also June C. Carrol et al., Primary Care Providers’
Experiences with and Perceptions of Personalized Genomic Medicine, 62 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSI-
CIAN e626 (2016), http://www.cfp.ca/content/cfp/62/10/e626.full.pdf.
122. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-
Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm.
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sult may lead to prophylactic (preventative) surgical removal of
breasts or ovaries.123
But this is somewhat perplexing in light of the FDA’s March 2018
approval of 23andMe’s cancer health risk test to provide information
to users on their status with respect to three out of more than one
thousand BRCA1/BRCA2 mutations.124 The FDA did nonetheless
impose a “special condition for use statement(s)” to specify that “[t]he
test does not diagnose cancer or any other health condition and
should not be used to make medical decisions.”125
Perhaps instead of attempting to maintain the diagnostic boundary
line, the FDA should instead emphasize the risk-based classification
for specific genetic associations.126 History could provide a guide. Two
decades ago, the FDA set up a framework to regulate the use of
analyte specific reagents (ASRs), raw materials, and components used
in certain IVDs used in laboratory tests.127 The majority of ASRs
123. Id. The FDA also singled out tests for cancer, prenatal tests, and pharmacogenetic panels
as requiring separate regulatory review. See Letter from Kelly Oliner, Dir., Div. of Immunology
& Hematology Devices, Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health, Ctr. for Devices
& Radiological Health, to Lisa Charter, Dir. Regulatory Affairs & Quality Assurance, 23andMe,
Inc. 22–23 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf16/den160026.pdf.
124. Indeed, the FDA’s approval of 23andMe’s BRCA screening was criticized on similar
grounds. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics & Genomics, AMCG Responds to FDA’s Ap-
proval for Direct-to-Consumer Testing for Three BRCA Gene Mutations, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 7,
2018, 6:18 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/acmg-responds-to-fdas-approval-
for-direct-to-consumer-testing-for-three-brca-gene-mutations-300610375.html (describing the in-
formation as “incomplete,” requiring “follow-up” and “context,” without taking an outright an-
tagonistic stance); Angela Chen, 23andMe’s New Genetic Test for Cancer Could Create a False
Illusion of Safety, VERGE (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/6/17086494/
23andme-genetic-testing-brca-cancer-health (quoting the President of the National Society of
Genetic Counselors) (“Although this test may help to identify people who have a previously
undetected BRCA mutation, there are several limitations and the results may be confusing or
misleading without appropriate education.”); Turna Ray, Oncology Community Sees Potential
for Patient Harm in FDA OK of 23andMe BRCA Test, GENOMEWEB (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www
.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/oncology-community-sees-potential-patient-harm-fda-
ok-23andme-brca-test#.XFhtqlxKjcs.
125. FDA BRCA1/BRCA2 DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 47, at 2. See also id. at 21 (in-
cluding as “special control” the inclusion of “[a] warning statement that the test does not diag-
nose cancer or any other health conditions and should not be used to make medical decisions”).
126. Accord Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 21, at 743.
127. ASRs are one of a handful of devices designated “restricted” by regulation. See Eric
Richardson, Presentation at the FDA Small Business Regulatory Education for Industry (REdI),
Medical Device Labeling 9 (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Development
ApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/UCM466479.pdf. Once deemed “restricted devices,”
the FDA can impose conditions on sale, distribution, and use of all ASRs. Specifically, the rule
“restricts ordering the use of in-house developed tests using ASR’s to physicians or other health
care practitioners . . . [and] also restricts the sale of ASR’s to those clinical laboratories regulated
under [CLIA].” Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte
Specific Reagents, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,243, 62,244 (Nov. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
809 and 864).
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were classified as Class I medical devices, exempted from premarket
notification of 510(k). But the FDA classified a small number of ASRs
as Class II or Class III because the FDA determined additional re-
quirements were necessary for their safe and effective use.128 The
FDA classified a small subset of ASRs as Class III devices whose “use
poses unique risks because of the substantial clinical and public health
impact of the information generated by using these devices.”129 At
that time, genetic tests using ASRs were developed exclusively in-
house by laboratories; such ASRs were not subject to the regulation
given that they were not commercially marketed independent of the
laboratory tests. Nonetheless, “FDA considered identifying a subset
of ASR’s that are used to develop tests intended for predictive genetic
diagnosis as ASR’s that pose unique risks to the public health because
of the substantial clinical impact of the information generated using
these devices.”130 But, at the time, the FDA was not able to “identif[y]
criteria that would logically distinguish among genetic tests in order to
determine which have the requisite impact to trigger more stringent
controls.”131
The FDA’s actual practice with respect to permitting 23andMe to
market various DTC genetic tests could be considered an attempt to
do just that. Along with each authorization, the FDA has established
“special controls”—namely criteria to assure the test’s accuracy,
clinical performance, and labeling. Take, for example, DTC
pharmacogenetic tests. The absence of FDA review poses a health and
The FDA also regulates advertising for “restricted” devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(q)–(r) (2012).
“Most Class III premarket approval devices have been restricted as a condition of approval, but
only a few Class I and Class II devices (such as hearing aids) are restricted by regulation.” John
Bentivoglio et al., Up to Their Old Devices? Why Differences in Drug and Device Promotion
Standards Matter from an Enforcement Perspective, FDLI: UPDATE, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 9, https://
www.skadden.com/-/media/files/publications/2013/10/update-article.pdf; Jeffery K. Shapiro,
What Legal Authority Does FDA Have to Regulate Medical Device Promotion on Internet Social
Media Platforms?, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2014/09/what-legal-
authority-does-fda-have-to-regulate-medical-device-promotion-on-internet-social-media-pla/
(“[N]o Class I or Class II devices are restricted except for hearing aids and ASRs. Additionally,
the handful of remaining Class III preamendment devices are not restricted, because they are
not subject to a PMA approval order.”).
128. Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte Specific
Reagents, 62 Fed. Reg. at 62,243–44.
129. Id. at 62,245. Examples include ASRs used in tests to diagnose HIV/AIDS or tuberculo-
sis. Id.
130. Id. “FDA considered designating as class III devices those ASR’s that would be mar-
keted independently for use in tests intended for use in overtly healthy people to identify a
genetic predisposition to a dementing disease, or to fatal or potentially fatal medical disorders
(e.g., cancers or Alzheimer’s disease), in situations where penetrance is poorly defined or varia-
ble and latency is 5 years or longer.” Id.
131. Id. at 62,246.
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safety risk to patients who “may change the dose of their medication
for a particular condition or disease based on the results of an un-
proven genetic test, which may result in inadequate care or worsening
illness.”132 As part of its authorization for 23andMe’s
Pharmacogenetic Reports, the FDA established six special controls,
including a labeling requirement that a warning statement must be
included noting that the consumer should not use the test results to
stop or change any medication. These controls serve as “risk manage-
ment strategies” central to the FDA’s assessment of benefit-risk of the
Pharmacogenetic test.133
The FDA took the further opportunity to issue the following
warning:
Today, we are warning the public about the FDA’s concerns with
pharmacogenetic tests whose claims have not been reviewed by the
FDA. Specifically, we are warning consumers about many such ge-
netic tests being marketed directly to consumers or offered through
health care providers that claim to predict how a patient will re-
spond to specific medications.134
Indeed, “as the big data industry matures, the companies that traffic in
health-related big data will face competitive pressures to make more
aggressive claims regarding what their analytics can predict.”135
B. The FDA as Health Information Regulator
The FDA has traditionally served an information production func-
tion (albeit one not as readily appreciated as its safety function). In
the era of “big data,” the FDA is poised to play an enhanced role as
health information regulator. The FDA can leverage its regulatory au-
thority to coordinate the production, dissemination, and use of geno-
mic information. Given its expertise, the FDA is primed to serve this
132. Shuren & Woodcock FDA Press Release, supra note 52. See also id. (“[T]he FDA is
aware that health care providers have made changes to patients’ medication based on genetic
test results that claim to provide information on the personalized dosage or treatment regimens
for some antidepressant mediations, which could potentially lead to patient harm.”).
133. See FDA PHARMACOGENETIC DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 15–16 (“Overall,
the likelihood of benefit of pharmacogenetic reports to describe variants associated with the
metabolism of some drugs in user reports and inform conversations with healthcare providers
that may prompt confirmatory pharmacogenetic testing outweighs the likelihood of erroneous
interpretation and incorrect action by the user or healthcare provider, when considering the
mitigations provided by the limitations and special controls, beyond general controls.”).
134. Shuren & Woodcock FDA Press Release, supra note 52.
135. Cortez, supra note 60, at 62 (“Already, patients and practitioners are inundated with
claims by thousands of smartphone apps that promise to use data in novel ways to diagnose or
manage scores of medical conditions.”).
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gatekeeping role. Moreover, the FDA’s medical device center has ex-
perience regulating software incorporated into medical devices.136
136. This potential for an enhanced agency role in regulating data and information is by no
means limited to the FDA. While the FDA has jurisdiction to ensure that devices are safe and
effective, the FTC has somewhat overlapping jurisdiction to pursue unfair and deceptive trade
practices, including spurious health claims. See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION: CONSUMER INFO. (Feb. 2018), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0166-direct-
consumer-genetic-tests (warning consumers to be skeptical of DTC GT company claims). With
the exception of “restricted” medical devices whose advertising is regulated by the FDA, see
Richardson, supra note 127, at 7, the FTC regulates all medical device advertising. FTC Act
Sections 5 and 12 prohibit unfair or deceptive trade practices and false advertising. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45, 52 (2012). The FTC does not require pre-approval, but it does require substantiation
“[f]or health, safety, or efficacy claims” with “competent and reliable scientific evidence.” En-
forcement Policy Statement on Marketing Claims for OTC Homeopathic Drugs, 81 Fed. Reg.
90,122, 90,122 (Dec. 13, 2016). “‘Competent and reliable scientific evidence’ [is] defined as ‘tests,
analyses, research, or studies that have been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by
qualified persons and [that] are generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and relia-
ble results.’” Id. While, as a general matter, this standard may be “more flexible, allowing a
broader range of claims” than the FDA’s substantial evidence requirement, its laxity may differ
by administration or the nature of the claim/product. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Staff Provides the FDA with Comments on First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine
(Sept. 20, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/09/ftc-staff-provides-fda-
comments-first-amendment-commercial-speech. For certain health claims (e.g., about specific
diseases), the FTC can require randomized, double-blinded, placebo-controlled clinical trials.
See, e.g., POM Wonderful, LLC, et al. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(implicating POM Wonderful’s claims that its juice products could help treat or prevent heart
disease, cancer, and other conditions).
In 2014, the FTC settled a case against GeneLink, Inc. and foru International Corp., a case in
which the FTC charged “that the companies didn’t have sound science to support that the[ir]
supplements could compensate for genetic disadvantages identified in the [provided] DNA test
and reduce that person’s risk of illness.” Lesley Fair, When DNA Stands for “Deceptive, Not
Authenticated”, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 7, 2014, 11:23 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2014/01/when-dna-stands-deceptive-not-authenticated. See also, e.g.,
Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Federal Neglect: Regulation of Genetic Testing, 22 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Spring 2006, http://issues.org/22-3/javitt/ (“The FTC has asserted its jurisdiction to take
action against genetic test advertising that is false or misleading, and the agency has announced a
joint effort with the FDA and NIH to identify appropriate targets for legal action.”). As the
Director of FTC’s Bureau of Enforcement said,
This case is about the consequences of making false claims . . . . It doesn’t matter
whether the claims deal with the benefits of direct-to-consumer genetic testing or the
privacy of personal information. It’s against the law to deceive people about your prod-
uct and to make promises you don’t keep.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Companies Pitching Genetically Customized Nutritional
Supplements Will Drop Misleading Claims (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/01/companies-pitching-genetically-customized-nutritional-supplements (internal
quotation marks omitted). Cf. Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen Dissenting in
Part and Concurring in Part, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/140107genelinkstatementohlhausen.pdf (“I voted against the con-
sent agreements in the matter of GeneLink, Inc. and foru International Corporation, however,
because they impose an unduly high standard of at least two randomized controlled trials (or
RCTs) to substantiate any disease-related claims, not just weight-loss claims. Adopting a one-
size-fits-all approach to substantiation by imposing such rigorous and possibly costly require-
ments for such a broad category of health- and disease-related claims may, in many instances,
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1. The FDA’s Traditional Role in Information Production
Rebecca Eisenberg pioneered the view that some of the FDA’s
drug regulation is best understood not only as safety regulation but
also as incentivizing the production of data and information as well as
incentivizing innovation policy more generally.137 Take, for example,
the regulation prohibiting drug manufacturers from marketing off-la-
bel uses of drugs (although physicians can legally administer off-label
drugs). Separate and apart from any safety concern per se is that this
incentivizes the drug manufacturer to submit additional clinical trial
evidence to the FDA to get the additional indicated use approved.
Thus, it is a mechanism whereby the FDA incentivizes the production
of medical information that would not otherwise be produced.
The FDA’s de novo regulatory framework for authorizing DTC ge-
netic tests performs a critical information production function. The
2016 FDA Guidance details the kinds of data the FDA finds useful
and lists the factors the FDA considers in assessing “benefit-risk”: (1)
the extent of probable benefits, (2) the extent of probable risk and
harms, (3) the amount of uncertainty with respect to the device’s
safety and efficacy, (4) patient-reported assessments and outcomes,
(5) the nature of the disease or condition that the device addresses, (6)
patient preferences, (7) the availability of alternative treatments or
diagnostics, (8) the availability of risk mitigation, (9) the results of
post-market studies, and (10) the extent to which the device addresses
some unmet medical need.138 In its 2017 final guidance on the de novo
process, the FDA elaborated on the “[s]upporting . . . [d]ata” a manu-
facturer should submit: “Provide a summary of all non-clinical and
clinical testing (if applicable) that provide a reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness for your specific device and that demonstrate
that general controls or general and special controls are sufficient to
prevent useful information from reaching consumers in the marketplace and ultimately make
consumers worse off.”).
137. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 107, at 345. Others have
further developed the same point. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 108, at 1035 (“Though con-
ventionally depicted as a drag on technological progress, FDA regulation actually may be a use-
ful tool to ameliorate some of the innovation policy concerns . . . .”); Chris Robertson, Tip of the
Iceberg II: How the Intended-Uses Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liability,
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 770 (2017). See generally Anup Malani & Thomas Philipson, The
Regulation of Medical Products, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BI-
OPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 100, 106–15 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson eds., 2012)
(describing dual components of FDA regulation of medical products as “minimum quality stan-
dard” and “production and dissemination of information and analysis about the quality of drugs
and devices”).
138. See FDA 2016 DE NOVO GUIDANCE, supra note 95.
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provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.”139 Indeed,
“the data requirements for de novo submissions more closely resem-
ble those for PMAs, in which sponsors are required to demonstrate
reasonable assurance that the subject device is safe and effective for
its intended use.”140
The FDA’s authorization decisions to date, moreover, attest to this
information production function in terms of the data on analytical va-
lidity and clinical studies put forth as part of de novo applications.141
As part of its authorization of 23andMe’s pharmacogenetic tests, the
FDA imposed special controls with respect to design verification and
control, requiring “[d]ata appropriate . . . to demonstrate the analyti-
cal accuracy and reliability of the device in intended use specimens,
including but not limited to precision, reproducibility, accuracy, limits
of detection, and interferences.”142 And as part of its authorization of
the BRCA1/BRCA2 test, the FDA required 23andMe to submit a
“summary of the clinical and analytical performance information that
must be generated” as well as “details about analytical testing that
must be performed and provides criteria for appropriate standards
that must be met for performance for many of the components of ana-
lytical testing in addition to the standards and evidence required to
support clinical performance.”143
Without the specter of FDA oversight, DTC genetic testing compa-
nies are not forced to provide underlying scientific data and informa-
tion, which, as a result, may not be produced. Thus, for example, in
the realm of pharmacogenetics, “the FDA is aware of genetic tests
that claim results can be used by physicians to identify which an-
tidepressant medication would have increased effectiveness or side ef-
fects compared to other antidepressant medications.”144 But, “the
relationship between DNA variations and the effectiveness of an-
tidepressant medications has never been established.”145
139. FDA 2017 DE NOVO GUIDANCE, supra note 94.
140. Michele L. Buenafe, Factors to Consider Before Submitting a De Novo Request, FDLI:
UPDATE, Mar./Apr. 2017, at 11, https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/publication/outside
%20publication/article/2017/update_april2017buenafe.ashx.
141. See, e.g., Michele Buenafe et al., The De Novo Pathway to Market, MORGAN LEWIS
17–18 (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/presentation/webin
ar/2017/fda_de-novo-pathway_9march17.ashx (“Of 26 de novo applications granted in [ ] 2016,
approximately: 4 required a prospective clinical study[,] 13 required clinical performance data[,]
3 required a usability study/assessment[, and] . . . [t]wo de novo submissions have required or are
scheduled for advisory panel review[.]”).
142. FDA PHARMACOGENETIC DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 16.
143. FDA BRCA1/BRCA1 DECISION SUMMARY, supra note 47, at 16.
144. Shuren & Woodcock FDA Press Release, supra note 52.
145. Id.
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Given the above, it is perhaps less surprising than it might seem at
first blush that the FDA, in its comments pushing back against the
Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act (DAIA), voiced concern
that the Act would restrict the FDA’s ability “to ask for raw data to
further evaluate the analytical and clinical validity of these tests,”
even though the FDA “could require pre- and post-market clinical
trial data for high-risk IVCTs.”146
2. The FDA’s Enhanced Role in the Era of “Big Data”
Information production may play an even more central role for
DTC genetic testing than it has for pharmaceutical companies in the
FDA drug approval process. Both the FDA and other scholars have
noted that the utility of next generation sequencing depends substan-
tially on the “robustness of ‘genetic variant data aggregation.’”147
23andMe (albeit now in the position of the regulated incumbent on
the market) stands as a powerful illustration of the force of private
market incentives in the development of DTC genetic tests and the
accumulation of aggregate datasets. 23andMe encourages its consum-
ers to opt in to research studies in which they volunteer to answer
questions about their personal and medical histories.148 Increasingly,
DTC genetic testing companies like 23andMe track their customers’
health over time.149 With that information, the DTC genetic testing
company is also either performing additional analyses itself or farming
out the data to drug and biomedical companies who are doing the
same.150 23andMe has a research arm that has secured federal
grants151 and publishes articles in peer-reviewed journals.152
146. Turna Ray, FDA Recommends Precertification Program to Legislators as They Consider
Dx Regulatory Reform, GENOMEWEB (May 4, 2018), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-di
agnostics/fda-recommends-precertification-program-legislators-they-consider-dx#.WwF2YVMvz
aZ.
147. See Rai, supra note 113, at 126 (citations omitted).
148. See, e.g., Research, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/research [https://web.archive
.org/web/20151015182009/https://www.23andme.com/research/] (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (“In
order for scientists and researchers to accelerate healthcare, they need large sets of data . . . from
all of us. Your research participation could contribute to findings in disease prevention, better
drug therapies, disease treatments and ultimately, genetic paths to cures. Once you purchase
your kit, you will have the choice to join this research revolution.”).
149. See Evans et al., supra note 1, at 2260; see also Kelly Servick, Can 23andMe Have It All?,
349 SCIENCE 1472, 1474 (2015) (“The 23andMe Cohort . . . [is] highly engaged.”).
150. See, e.g., Spector-Bagdady, supra note 15, at 516; see also supra note 16.
151. See, e.g., 23andMe Receives $1.7M NIH Grant to Create Sequencing Panel for African
Americans, GENOMEWEB (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/sequencing/23andme-re
ceives-17m-nih-grant-create-sequencing-panel-african-americans#.XCBaA89KiYU.
152. See generally Publications, 23ANDME, https://research.23andme.com/publications/#publi
cations (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-2\DPL209.txt unknown Seq: 38 27-MAR-19 12:32
380 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:343
The FDA faces a peculiar regulatory challenge in the face of the
accumulation of immense private datasets by companies such as
23andMe. At the same time, the FDA has distinct advantages as
health information regulator given its role as a gatekeeper for insur-
ance coverage. Moreover, the FDA may be uniquely well suited to
serve as a model for an experimentalist approach to data regulation,
especially in light of some nascent initiatives at the frontier of digital
and data science.
a. FDA as Gatekeeper for Insurance Coverage
In March 2018, CMS announced that the federal healthcare pro-
gram will cover the costs of cancer genetic tests that have been ap-
proved by the FDA.153 Private insurers often follow the lead of
Medicare coverage. Moreover, the testing will generate a huge volume
of genomic data on Medicare patients, whose treatments and out-
comes can be tracked. This data in turn will assist hospitals and com-
panies to gather evidence to validate their own tests; moreover, it can
assist pharmaceutical companies in filling their clinical trials with ge-
netically-matched patients.
b. FDA Poised to Advance an Experimentalist Approach to Data
Regulation
i. The Promise of Publicly Accessible Global Databases
According to the FDA, it “currently houses the largest known re-
pository of clinical data.”154 In 2008, the FDA launched the Sentinel
Initiative, a national electronic system for monitoring safety problems
with drugs, vaccines, biologics, and medical devices, relying on data
from electronic health records, insurance claims, and other sources.155
As the FDA noted in a 2011 paper entitled “Driving Biomedical Inno-
vation: Initiatives to Improve Products for Patients,” “the ability to
share information in a public forum about why products fail, without
compromising proprietary information, presents the potential to save
153. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Finalizes Coverage of Next
Generation Sequencing Tests, Ensuring Enhanced Access for Cancer Patients (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-finalizes-coverage-next-generation-sequenc
ing-tests-ensuring-enhanced-access-cancer-patients.
154. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRIVING BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION: INITIATIVES TO IM-
PROVE PRODUCTS FOR PATIENTS 22 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, DRIVING BIOMEDICAL
INNOVATION].
155. See FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/safety/fdassentinelinitiative/
ucm2007250.htm (last updated Jan. 9, 2019). The Sentinel Initiative was created by the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007. Id.
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companies millions of dollars by preventing duplication of failure.”156
More ambitiously, the FDA articulated one of its strategic priorities:
“[T]o develop a global data information system and network in which
regulators worldwide can regularly and proactively share real-time in-
formation and resources across markets.”157
Toward this end, the FDA has taken steps to increase public access
to its compliance and enforcement data.158 In February 2015, the FDA
released a paper entitled “Plan to Increase Access to Results of FDA-
Funded Scientific Research.”159
ii. Genetic Testing Initiatives
In 2016, the FDA launched precisionFDA, which is an online
database that seeks to gather information from various sources about
Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) to enable interested parties to
“access and share datasets, analysis pipelines, and bioinformatics
tools, in order to benchmark their approaches and advance regulatory
science.”160
On April 13, 2018, the FDA released a final guidance entitled “Use
of Public Human Genetic Variant Databases to Support Clinical Va-
lidity for Genetic and Genomic-Based In Vitro Diagnostics.”161 The
guidance document describes “how publicly accessible databases of
human genetic variants can serve as sources of valid scientific evi-
dence to support the clinical validity of genotype-phenotype relation-
ships in FDA’s regulatory review of both NGS-based tests and genetic
and genomic tests based on other technologies.”162 Further, the gui-
156. See FDA, DRIVING BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION, supra note 154, at 22.
157. Dara Katcher Levy, Pathway to Global Product Safety and Quality—FDA’s Report Re-
garding Improving the Quality of Imports, FDA L. BLOG (June 23, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog
.net/2011/06/pathway-to-global-product-safety-and-quality-fdas-report-regarding-improving-the-
quality-of-imports/.
158. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION TRANS-




159. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN TO INCREASE ACCESS TO RESULTS OF FDA-FUNDED
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/scienceresearch/aboutsciencere
searchatfda/ucm435418.pdf.
160. About precisionFDA, PRECISIONFDA, https://precision.fda.gov/about/what (last visited
Jan. 31, 2019).
161. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2016-D-1233, USE OF PUBLIC HUMAN GENETIC VA-
RIANT DATABASES TO SUPPORT CLINICAL VALIDITY FOR GENETIC AND GENOMIC-BASED IN
VITRO DIAGNOSTICS: GUIDANCE FOR STAKEHOLDERS AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm509837.pdf.
162. Id. at 4.
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dance notes that “[p]ublicly accessible genetic databases may be use-
ful to support the clinical validity of NGS tests as well as single gene
or panel tests that use other technology.”163
The guidance notes that “[i]n relying on assertions in genetic variant
databases that follow the recommendations in this guidance, [the]
FDA hopes to encourage the deposition of genetic variant information
in such publicly accessible databases, reduce regulatory burden on test
developers, and spur advancements in the evaluation and implementa-
tion of precision medicine.”164
The FDA can leverage its regulatory authority to coordinate both
the production and dissemination and use of genomic information.
Existing law does not provide any regulatory data exclusively for
FDA-approved diagnostic tests—or for medical devices more gener-
ally. In this way, the policy environment differs sharply from that gov-
erning pharmaceutical drug trial data disclosure.165 In the absence of
Congressional action, the FDA should consider stepping in to provide
incentives to DTC genetic test companies like those contained in the
Hatch-Waxman Act.166 Scholars have proposed mandatory disclosure
of proprietary information coupled with FDA-administered data and
market exclusivities like those that are available for innovative
drugs.167 Alternatively,
Licensing requirements for diagnostic tests could be set to drive in-
formation production, and the agency could coordinate a sharing
regime through structured, staged disclosure of proprietary genomic
data. For instance, approval of diagnostic genetic tests might be con-
ditioned on deposit of newly discovered variants into a centralized
public database, with manufacturers permitted to keep undisclosed
proprietary algorithms and aggregate data sets.168
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
165. Specifically, there is no Hatch-Waxman Act-like coverage for data underlying diagnostic
tests. For an overview of the impetus behind the Act, the authority it grants the FDA, and the
consequences of that authority, see, for example, Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation
Policy, supra note 107, at 356–59. For a further elaboration of how the Act might apply in ge-
netic testing space, see Laakmann, supra note 108, at 1036–37.
166. Laakmann, supra note 108, at 1036 (“Existing regulations governing medical product in-
formation provide a template for the FDA to coordinate the generation and use of genomic
data.”).
167. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467,
472–73 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011); Rai, supra note 113, at
1666.
168. Laakmann, supra note 108, at 1038.
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iii. Innovation Incubator to Harness the Power of “Big Data”
Housed within the FDA’s Oncology Center of Excellence, Informa-
tion Exchange and Data Transformation (INFORMED) “is a decen-
tralized science and technology incubator designed to harness the
power of big data and advanced analytics to improve disease out-
comes.”169 It seeks (1) to standardize and aggregate data that comes
from a variety of sources (including, for example, clinical trial data
submitted to the FDA)170; (2) to “develop[ ], deploy[ ], and dis-
seminat[e] novel technologies and best practices for big data[;]”171 and
(3) to “serv[e] as an incubator focused on driving innovations in agile
technology development and advanced analytics,” while “plac[ing]
special emphasis on data sharing and the creation of new data as-
sets.”172 As such, it appears to be a mini information and innovation
engine housed within the FDA.
“The objective is to make data analytics an integral part of regula-
tory decision-making, supported by novel public-private collabora-
tions to engage industry, academia, patients and other FDA
stakeholders in a common assault against the silos that limit big data’s
potential in fighting disease, particularly for biologically complex con-
ditions like cancer.”173 The “emerging active engagement of FDA on
digital and data science is . . . critical to the future growth of bi-
opharma, which in many ways is now an information business.”174
“[B]ig data sets now rule the day at FDA—and will set the agenda for
tomorrow.”175
CONCLUSION
The FDA plays one small but significant part in the wider effort to
gather and disseminate data in the health sector. Its emergent hybrid
regulatory model for DTC genetic testing has potential implications
for ensuring the creation of underlying evidence and substantiation of
169. Sean Khozin, Richard Pazdur, & Anand Shah, INFORMED: An Incubator at the US
FDA for Driving Innovation in Data Science and Agile Technology, 17 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 529, 529 (2018).
170. Genetic data would be included as well. See id. (“In addition, biomedical sciences in
general are largely siloed into specific disciplines rather than multidisciplinary units that can
support understanding of disease and the patient’s experience based on the totality of intrinsic
(for example, ‘omics’ data) and extrinsic (for example, environmental) variables influencing
clinical outcomes.”) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 530.
172. Id.
173. William Looney, Big Data and the FDA: To Mine the Value, First Mind the Gaps, 36 IN
VIVO, May 2018, at 24, 24.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 25.
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“big data” medical claims. The FDA has traditionally regulated medi-
cal products such as drugs and medical devices as well as the accompa-
nying labeling. With respect to DTC genetic testing, the FDA
recognizes the significance of the fact that the product being sold is
“medical information” and thus should be subject to regulation on
health and safety grounds. But the FDA has also traditionally served
an information production function, although it is not as readily ap-
preciated as its safety function. Regulation is needed to ensure accu-
racy of test results as well as sufficient production of underlying
scientific research. In the era of “big data,” the FDA is poised to play
an enhanced role as health information regulator. The FDA can lever-
age its regulatory authority to coordinate the production, dissemina-
tion, and use of genomic information.
